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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie tesis ondersoek hoe Karl Weick se konsep van singewing ons insig teenoor swak 
seine, tekens, waarskuwingsanalise en sagteware binne vroeë waarskuwingstelsels verbeter. 
Weick se bydrae verskaf ‘n raamwerk waarbinne hierdie konsepte geanaliseer en ondersoek 
kan word. Die konsep van swak seine, vroeë-waarskuwing en visuele analise word binne 
huidige besigheidsuitgangspunte, en die formele intelligensie arena ondersoek. 
Die mislukking van intelligensie is kenmerkend van gebeure soos 9/11, die onlangse 
finansiёle krisis wat  deur die ondergang van Lehman Brothers ingelei is, en die sogenaamde 
“Arab Spring”. Hierdie gebeure het ‘n wêreldwye opskudding op ekonomiese en politiese 
vlak veroorsaak. Moderne metodologieё soos vroeë waarskuwingsanalise, swaksein-analise 
en omgewingsaanskouing binne regerings- en besigheidsverband het duidelik in hul 
doelstelling misluk om voortydig te waarsku oor hierdie gebeurtenisse. Dit is juis hierdie 
mislukkings wat dit noodsaaklik maak om meer aandag te skenk aan hierdie konsepte, asook 
nuwe tegnologie wat dit kan verbeter. 
Hoofstuk Een is inleidend en stel die navorsingsvraagstuk, doelwitte en afbakkening. 
Hoofstuk Twee lê die fondasie van die tesis deur ‘n ondersoek van die hoof konsepte. 
Hoofstuk Drie verskaf die teoretiese raamwerk, die van Weick se singewingsteorie, waarteen 
die hoof konsepte in Hoofstuk Twee ondersoek word in Hoofstuk Vier. Klem word gelê op 
die diepte van integrasie en die toepassing van raamwerke in die analisefase van vroeё 
waarskuwingstelsels en hoe dit binne die teoretiese beginsels van visuele analise 
geïnkorporeer word.  
Die bevindinge van hierdie tesis spreek die feit aan dat Weick se konsepsualisering van 
singewing konseptuele helderheid rakende die begrip “swakseine” verskaf. In hierdie verband 
verteenwoordig Weick se “saad”- metafoor die samewerking en uitbouing van seine en 
“padpredikante” wat die progressiewe aard van swakseine weerspieёl. 
Die kernbeskouing van hierdie tesis is die belangrikheid van Weick se 
geloofsgedrewesingewing, veral die uitkoms van die bou van raamwerke asook die 
bespreking hiervan deur verskeie navorsers. Die belangrikheid van  die  aksie om seine op te 
merk, en die effek wat dit op die herbeskouing van raamwerke het, asook die raaksien 
daarvan in die eerste plek word beklemtoon. Laasgenoemde dui ook aan tot watter mate 
Weick se singewingsteorie ‘n bydrae maak tot visuele analise veral in ons begrip van die 
gevolg wat data of inligtingspesifikasie het op die identifisering van seine en onsinnighede in 
visualisering binne visuele analise-sagteware. 
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SUMMARY 
This thesis considers the contribution that Karl Weick’s notion of sensemaking can make to 
an improved understanding of weak signals, cues, warning analysis, and software within 
early warning systems. Weick’s sensemaking provides a framework through which the above 
mentioned concepts are discussed and analysed. The concepts of weak signals, early warning 
systems, and Visual Analytics are investigated from within current business and formal 
intelligence viewpoints. 
Intelligence failure has been a characteristic of events such as 9/11, the recent financial crisis 
triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and the so-called Arab Spring. Popular 
methodologies such as early warning analysis, weak signal analysis and environmental 
scanning employed within both the business and government sphere failed to provide 
adequate early warning in many of these events. These failures warrant renewed attention as 
to what improvements can be made and how new technology can enhance early warning 
analysis. 
Chapter One is introductory and states the research question, methodology, and delimits the 
thesis. Chapter Two sets the scene by investigating current conceptions of the main 
constructs. Chapter Three explores Weick’s theory of sensemaking, and provides the 
analytical framework against which these concepts are then analysed in Chapter Four. The 
emphasis is directed towards the extent of integration of frames within the analysis phase of 
early warning systems and how frames may be incorporated within the theoretical foundation 
of Visual Analytics to enhance warning systems.  
The findings of this thesis suggest that Weick’s conceptualisation of sensemaking provide 
conceptual clarity to weak signal analysis in that Weick’s “seed” metaphor, representing the 
embellishment and elaboration of cues, epitomizes the progressive nature of weak signals. 
The importance of Weick’s notion of belief driven sensemaking, in specific the role of 
expectation in the elaboration of frames, and discussed and confirmed by various researchers 
in different study areas, is a core feature underlined in this thesis. The centrality of the act of 
noticing and the effect that framing and re-framing has thereon is highlighted as a primary 
notion in the process of not only making sense of warning signals but identifying them in the 
first place. This ties in to the valuable contribution Weick’s sensemaking makes to 
understanding the effect that a specification has on identifying transients and signals in the 
resulting visualization in Visual Analytic software. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
It is pardonable to be defeated, but never to be surprised – Frederick the Great1 
 
 
1.1  Background 
In fusing the definitions provided by Austin2, Choo3, Schwartz4 and Matveeva,5 an early 
warning system can be defined as: any initiative, network of actors, resources, technologies, 
practices, and organizational structures that focus on the systematic collection, analysis, and 
formulation of recommendations relating to the monitoring of an environment. The purpose 
of this is to detect opportunities, threats, discontinuities or strategic surprises. An early 
warning system is a key component in the functioning of an efficient intelligence capability.  
Within management literature, early warning has received considerable attention since the 
publication of Francis Aguilar’s6 Scanning the Business Environment in 1967 and H. Igor 
Ansoff’s7, Managing Strategic Surprise by Response to Weak Signals in 1975. In particular, 
the notion of scanning the business environment for weak signals to provide forewarning of 
discontinuities, threats and opportunities became the focal point in contemporary 
organisations.8  
Early warning and intelligence failure in business and government, is normally purported to 
be the failure to notice disparate cues or signals within the environment.  This failure centres 
                                                 
1 Green, R 2006. The 33 Strategies of War. Viking Penguin 
2Austin, A 2004. Early Warning and the Field: A cargo Cult Science? Berghof handbook for conflict 
transformation, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, August 
http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/austin_handbook.pdf , accessed 2010-06-08 
3 Choo, CW 1999. The art of scanning the environment 
4 Swartz, JO 2005. Pitfalls in implementing a strategic early warning system (23) 
5 Matveeva, A 2006. Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas. Global 
Partnership for the prevention of armed conflict. Issue Paper 1, European Centre for Conflict Prevention. 
http://www.gppac.net , accessed 2010-08-07 
6 Aguilar, FJ 1967. Scanning the Business Environment 
7 Ansoff, HI 1975. Managing Strategic Surprise… 
8 Seidl, D 2004. The Concept of “Weak Signals” Revisited… (151) 
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around human ability to make sense of available information in time to provide adequate 
warning. Research into the surprise attack at Pearl Harbour 1941,9 Russian surprise with 
Operation Barbarossa in 1941,10 Israeli surprise of the Yom Kippur war 1973,11 the fall of the 
Soviet Union 1989,12 the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 199013 and the failure to foresee the 9/1114 
attack all precluded a lack of information as reason. Rather, as Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski 
argue, the dominant reason for strategic surprise is: “[The] incorrect comprehension of the 
meaning of available information before the attack – rather than the lack of such information 
per se.” 15 
This inability to comprehend the correct meaning of available information and make sense of 
it, is further compounded by paradoxes evident in the emergence of the knowledge society. 
As Tsoukas16 states, the growth and development of information and communication 
technology has created a knowledge society that is fundamentally dependent on knowledge 
for its functioning. The irony is that this dependency on, and availability of information, has 
increased uncertainty and unpredictability, and contributes to the complex environment 
within which early warning systems function. Consequently, new software technology such 
as Visual Analytics has been developed to deal with the growth of information and data 
availability in early warning system analysis. Visual Analytics17 may be defined as “the 
science of analytical reasoning facilitated by interactive visual interfaces.” 
Within the perspective of making sense of information and signals, Karl Weick18 has 
contributed a large body of knowledge to the study of sensemaking in organisations. Weick 
has proposed a framework of seven properties of sensemaking to explain how sensemaking 
                                                 
9 Wohlstetter, R 1962. Pearl Harbour…; Marrin, S  2004. Preventing intelligence failures… 
10 Stine, R 1974. Codeword Barbarossa;  Kenez, P 1999. The History of the Soviet Union from Beginning to the 
End; Marrin, S. 2004. Preventing intelligence failure… 
11 Bar-Joseph, U 2005. The Watchman Fell Asleep: The surprise of Yom Kippur and its sources 
12 Xenakis, CI 2002. What happened in the Soviet Union? 
13Allen, CE 1998. Warning and Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait; O’Learly, J 1994. Surprise and Intelligence…; 
Unknown Author, 2002, Intelligence Failures: Some Historical Lessons, Part 2. The Estimate. Volume XV, 
No 12,  http://www.theestimate.com/public/062802.html , accessed 2010-10-10 
14 Byman, D 2005. Strategic Surprise and the September 11 Attacks; Posner, RA 2005. Preventing Surprise 
Attacks 
15 Bar-Joseph, U & Kruglanski, AW 2003. Intelligence Failure and the Need… (77) 
16 Tsoukas, H 2005. Complex Knowledge (21, 31-34) 
17 Thomas, JJ  & Cook, KA 2005. Illuminating the Path (4) 
18 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations; Weick, KE 2001. Making Sense of the Organization 
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works. In particular, Weick19 argues that sensemaking is “focused on and by Extracted cues” 
and that when a cue is connected to a frame a unit of meaning is established. 
The main premise of this thesis is that Karl Weick’s theory of sensemaking, in particular his 
theory of frames and framing, can make a contribution to a more sophisticated and effective 
weak signal analysis in warning systems. Therefore, noticing of weak signals, environmental 
scanning, Visual Analytics, and sensemaking within early warning systems are concepts that 
provide the cornerstones around which this thesis is built. 
1.2  Research proposition 
In the current discourse pertaining to weak signal analysis, environmental scanning, warning 
system analysis, and Visual Analytics there is a mutually enriching theoretical overlap with 
the concept of sensemaking. Sensemaking can be viewed as a critical component, as without 
it the value and contribution of these concepts in helping organisations recognize 
opportunities and threats are diminished. 
1.2.1  Research objective 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate how the incorporation of Weick’s frames theory of 
sensemaking in the early warning process, may improve cue and weak signal recognition; and 
how it can be incorporated into the theoretical underpinnings of Visual Analytics in support 
of early warning systems. The investigation may provide an improved model of early 
warning systems analysis, which may pave the way for an intervention on a practical level. 
The application of Weick’s frames theory of sensemaking may not necessarily solve all the 
conceptual problems associated with weak signals, cues, Visual Analytics and warning 
analysis. However, the intended outcome of this research, is to demonstrate, that the 
application of Weick’s concepts of “frames” and “cues,” as an analytical framework, 
facilitates and promotes a higher level of insight and understanding of the meaning of these 
concepts. 
1.2.2  Methodology and assumptions 
In order to attain the stated research objective, that of building and expanding on current early 
warning theory and models, a conceptual approach is followed. The research strategy adopted 
was to evaluate the current literature on weak signal analysis, environmental scanning, Visual 
                                                 
19 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (50) 
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Analytics, and early warning systems by using a Weickian sensemaking framework as an 
interpretive lens. Weick’s20 theory of sensemaking is used as a point of departure to compare 
and critically review the conceptual foundations of weak signal analysis, environmental 
scanning and Visual Analytics in early warning analysis. 
Conceptual analysis seeks to increase our understanding of concept usage by reducing 
complex concepts to more fundamental and simple levels. This is achieved by explication 
which reveals these concepts’ constituent elements and parts. The goal of submitting 
constructs such as weak signals, environmental scanning, early warning system analysis, and 
Visual Analytics to conceptual analysis is “to increase conceptual clarity of a theory through 
careful clarifications and specifications of meaning”21 ultimately comparing and clearly 
delimiting them. 
A critical review from a sensemaking perspective may force a re-evaluation of these concepts 
and improve organisational early warning and decision making capabilities in particular, and 
the use and implementation of analytical visualisation software in general. It is against this 
background, characterized by constructs such as information overload, the inability to 
comprehend the correct meaning, uncertainty, unpredictability, complexity and software tools 
developed in an attempt to solve some of these challenges in early warning systems that this 
thesis makes a contribution to building and expanding current theory, models, and existing 
knowledge. 
Making sense of warning information in an early warning system requires a “crystal ball” like 
gaze into some possible future state. Bodnar defines warning as “a prediction of the future.” 22 
In this regard Tsoukas23 and Narayanan and Fahley24 posit that the future, from an ontological 
perspective, is non-existent, open-ended and un-knowable. Therefore, the assumption is made 
that the future potentiality of weak signals and cues have to be determined from within a 
constructivist epistemological grounding. However, it is accepted in this thesis that from 
within a sensemaking perspective humans and reality can be both ordered and chaotic, which 
require very different epistemological approaches. Weick simultaneously propagates a realist 
                                                 
20 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations 
21 Machado, A & Silva, FJ 2007. Towards a richer view… (671) quoting Lauden, L 1977. Progress and its 
problems: Towards a theory of scientific growth.  Berkley. University of California Press 
22 Bodnar, JM 2003. Warning analysis for the information age… (11) 
23 Tsoukas, H 2005. Complex Knowledge (276) 
24 Narayanan, VK & Fahey, L 2004. Invention and navigation as contrasting metaphors… (39) 
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and idealist ontology, “that something is out there to be sensed” and “that something out there 
needs to be agreed on and constructed plausibly.” 25 Consequently, a pluralist epistemological 
grounding is accepted in evaluating Weick’s sensemaking relative to the constructs 
investigated in this thesis. 
1.2.3 Delimitation 
The scope of this study is limited to literature on early warning systems as are found in the 
formal intelligence, Futures Studies and business early warning sectors. Warning systems 
where the collection and interpretation of telemetric data is the central focus of the warning 
system, are excluded. Examples in this regard are earth quake, tsunami, extreme weather 
warning systems and geological hazards. Weak signals literature as part of the attenuation of 
signals in physical, engineering, and electronic communication systems are also excluded. 
Within Futures Studies, extensive literature regarding weak signals are available in Nordic 
countries such as Finland. In this regard only English text were used and where possible 
references to non-English texts were used as referenced and quoted in other English texts. 
Similarly, an investigation into the epistemological foundations of current and past research 
relating to weak signals analysis, environmental scanning, and Visual Analytics fall outside 
the scope of this thesis as a pluralist epistemological assumption is assumed. 
Analytical and psychological bias has featured prominently in discourses relating to 
intelligence failure, warning and surprise. Although the influence of these biases is 
recognized, they fall outside of the scope of this thesis. 
The sensemaking theory of Weick is the point of departure and other frameworks such as that 
of Dervin,26 Aaltonen27 and Kurtz and Snowden28 are not included. However, the work of 
Gary Klein is referenced in part where deemed applicable due to the close association and 
similarities on an individual level of sensemaking. So-called “sensemaking” frameworks are 
discussed relating to Visual Analytics, but they refer to representation construction models 
and referred to where necessary in the thesis as “sense-making.” 
                                                 
25 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (55) 
26 Dervin Et al. 2003. Sense-Making Methodology Reader 
27 Aaltonen, M 2007. Strategic Decision-making 
28 Kurtz, CF & Snowden, DJ 2003. The new dynamics of strategy 
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Furthermore, framing is a highly abstract concept. Because of its abstract nature, an artificial 
delimitation is necessary during analysis in terms of looking at framing as a snapshot or 
singularity when in fact it is a continuous cycle or process. The on-going nature of framing 
operations is acknowledged explicitly throughout this thesis. However, in some instances it is 
viewed as a singular event allowing a logical “window” to investigate instances of where a 
cue is placed within a frame to establish meaning.29 
1.3 Structure of thesis 
In order to use Weick’s theory of sensemaking as a framework to evaluate weak signals, 
warning systems and Visual Analytics as set out in the research objective, the thesis is 
structured according to the following chapters: 
Chapter One is the introduction to the thesis and provides a general background, problem 
statement, methodology to be followed, and delimitation. 
Chapter Two sets the foundation of the thesis by exploring the key concepts of warning, early 
warning analysis models, Visual Analytics and weak signals in three distinct sub-sections. 
Chapter Three reviews Karl Weick’s theory of sensemaking in specific the role of framing in 
noticing cues. The seven properties of sensemaking are briefly discussed to provide 
background. This chapter provides the framework through which the constructs discussed in 
Chapter Two will be analysed. 
Chapter Four is an analysis of the constructs discussed in Chapter Two relative to the 
framework provided by Weick’s sensemaking in Chapter Three. The initial focus is on weak 
signals. Secondly, the addition of frames theory of sensemaking in warning systems is 
evaluated. The concept of Warning Event Bridging (WEB) is introduced, after which 
Weick’s contribution is assessed relative to software and Visual Analytics in particular.  
Chapter Five, the final chapter, concludes the thesis by a discussion of the implications that 
Weick’s framework holds for the weak signals, early warning analysis, and Visual Analytics. 
  
                                                 
29 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (111) 
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Chapter 2 
Cues, weak signals, and Visual 
Analytics in early warning systems 
Control people’s perception of reality and you control them – Robert Green 30 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Chapter Two sets the foundation of the thesis by exploring key concepts such as Warning, 
Early Warning Analysis Models, Visual Analytics31 and Weak Signals in three specific 
sections. The first section includes perspectives relating to early warning analysis models 
within both the formal intelligence and business environment. Warning as a concept is briefly 
explored within: (1) the formal intelligence environment, focusing on how it fits within the 
intelligence cycle, and issues relating to analytical processes and (2) the business 
environment. 
Section two is a synopsis of Visual Analytics models, which has a specific function of trying 
to create opportunity in the large and overwhelming amount of information available to 
warning analysts. In specific, its supporting role of helping analysts to make sense of large 
datasets in providing interactive visualisations to facilitate analysis is reviewed.  
The third section investigates conceptualisations of weak signals. It focuses on the signals 
and cues that provide individuals with forewarning of possible surprise, in specific the notion 
of weak signals that supposedly provide forewarning of impending change. Different 
perspectives relating to weak signals are discussed, as well as the contributions made from a 
constructivist stance by authors such as Seidl, Rossel, and Narayanan and Farley. 
 
                                                 
30 Green, R 2006. The 33 Strategies of War (299) 
31 The term Visual Analytics (Analytics in plural form) refers to a specific science and will be used in this 
format throughout this thesis to denote the science. 
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2.2  Section One – Warning and intelligence 
The experienced US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Cynthia Grabo has provided 
insights into analysis for strategic warning and anticipating surprise within the field of 
warning intelligence.32 Grabo recognises warning intelligence as a distinct function of 
intelligence, rather than a definable type of intelligence product, which is distinguished by its 
purpose or function. Grabo describes warning as intangible, an abstraction, a theory, 
perception, belief or product of reasoning or logic, “a hypothesis whose validity cannot be 
confirmed or refuted until it is too late.”33 Bodnar, building on Grabo’s work, states that:   
Warning is a prediction of the future that matches past and current indicators with a 
model of the future. Therefore, warning depends very heavily on models or mental 
images of what the world is and how it works.34 
Warning is an assessment of probabilities, lacks absolute certainty, and does not exist until it 
has been conveyed to policy or decision-makers. Grabo maintains that warning produces a 
conviction that results in action and that most crises have roots deep in the past. In this regard 
the best warning analysis does not flow from the “most methodical and diligent review of 
current information” but rather all possible information.35 
Of importance is Grabo’s distinction between “indication” and “indicator.” An indicator is 
defined as something which we anticipate or expect to occur, and can be incorporated into a 
list of things that have to be monitored. An indication is a development of any sort or kind, a 
confirmed or possible fact, or an absence of something or fragment thereof, and uncertain by 
nature. The distinction is made between an expectation and actuality or between a theory and 
a current development – “Information that any step is actually being implemented constitutes 
an indication.”36 This distinction is an important one from a sensemaking perspective, and 
from this thesis’s point of view, as the identification of an indicator triggers an expectation on 
the side of the analyst monitoring a situation for indications. The importance of expectation 
as a belief-driven form of sensemaking will become clearer in the chapters to follow. 
                                                 
32 Grabo, CM 2004. Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning. University Press of America. New 
York. The book is an abridged version of a trilogy of three volumes spanning 800 pages. It took Grabo three 
years to write and 30 years before it was declassified and made available for public release. 
33 Grabo, CM 2004. Anticipating Surprise (3-4) 
34 Bodnar, JW 2003. Warning Analysis for the information Age… (11) 
35 Grabo, CM 2004. Anticipating Surprise (6-7) 
36 Grabo, CM 2004. Anticipating Surprise (3) 
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Warning from within the intelligence community is understood within a broad sense in that it 
encompasses activities that provide support to policy and decision makers in attaining their 
strategic goals. This, according to Cooper,37 includes making sense of the strategic 
environment, assessment of alternatives and, above all, protecting against consequential 
surprise. However, due to the increased globally networked society as a consequence of the 
knowledge economy, transnational issues such as terrorism, organized crime, money 
laundering, narcotics, human organ trafficking, illicit copper and weapons trade have 
increased the complexity and scope of the monitoring brief of intelligence services. Cavelty 
and Mauer state that this new spectrum of threats is subject to characteristics such as 
complexity, uncertainty and a diminishing impact of geographical space.38 
2.2.1  The intelligence cycle and analysis process  
Intelligence is produced within an intelligence-tasked organisation via what is commonly 
known as the intelligence cycle. This cycle has been described by Marrin39 as: 
 …[a] heuristic device to portray the flow of information between intelligence agencies and 
policymakers – provides a descriptive theory of intelligence that is a good starting point for 
the interaction between information (facts), knowledge, and decision…[and] this cyclic 
process provides both scholars and practitioners with a framework for understanding the 
processes that underlie analytic production. 
The cycle is a five-step process that starts with Planning and Direction where decision and 
policy makers provide their information requirements which then directs the Collection 
process. Collected information either from human, signals, technical or geographical based 
sources40 are Processed and passed on to intelligence analysts for analytical evaluation. 
Analysts Disseminate the analysed intelligence back to the decision or policymakers. This 
process is normally depicted as a cyclic flow as illustrated in figure 1 on page 10: 
                                                 
37 Cooper, JR 2005. Curing Analytical Pathologies (16) 
38 Cavelty, MD & Mauer, V 2009. Postmodern Intelligence: Strategic warning… (128) 
39 Marrin, S 2009. Intelligence Analysis and decision-making (131) 
40 This is not a complete list of sources of intelligence. Sources of intelligence are normally classified as per 
information source or sensor type: HUMINT - Human Intelligence, SIGINT- Signals Intelligence, OSINT – 
Open Source Intelligence, GEOINT – Geospatial Intelligence, TECHINT – Technical Intelligence.  
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Figure 1 - The Intelligence Cycle41 
There is considerable debate as to whether this cycle is an accurate depiction of intelligence 
production. This traditional view gives the impression, according to Johnson,42 that all inputs 
into the cycle are constant and have a mechanical-like flow. Johnson examined the traditional 
cycle from a systematic and systemic perspective. He states that this traditional model does 
not accurately represent the differences in cognitive complexity involved in producing 
different kinds of intelligence products such as long-range assessments or national 
intelligence estimates.43 A comprehensive discussion relating to the efficacy of the traditional 
intelligence cycle is provided by Duvenage,44 Johnson45 and Marrin.46 For the purposes of 
this thesis it is accepted as a heuristic in the similar manner as intended earlier by Marrin. 
                                                 
41 CIA Intelligence Cycle. Diagram source: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/facttell/intcycle.htm  
42 Johnson, R 2005. Analytical Culture in the US Intelligence Community – An Ethnographic Study. The Center 
for Intelligence Study, Washington. Available at, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/analytic 
culture.pdf , accessed 2011-05-22 
43 Johnson, R 2005. Analytical Culture in the US Intelligence Community (45-51) 
44 Duvenage, MA 2010. Intelligence Analysis in the Knowledge Age. An analysis of the Challenges facing the 
Practice of Intelligence. M.Phil Thesis, Stellenbosch University. Available at  http://scholar.sun.ac.za/ 
bitstream/handle/10019.1/3087/duvenage-m-a-2010.pdf?sequence=3 , accessed 2012-12-20 
45 Johnson, R 2005. Analytical Culture in the US Intelligence Community – An Ethnographic Study. The Center 
for Intelligence Study, Washington. Available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/analytic 
culture.pdf , accessed 2011-05-22 
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The effectiveness of structured versus intuitive analytical techniques is also a subject of 
intense debate in the intelligence analysis community since the publishing of Richards J. 
Heuer’s book, The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.47 Sundry Khalsa48 has provided a 
good summation of this debate, detailing arguments from proponents within the intuitive and 
structured analytical camps. Khalsa argues for a combination of structured analytical 
techniques and intuition in early warning analysis - a systematic analytical process. She 
proposes seven distinct phases within the warning analysis process that is set out in table 1 on 
page 12. Indicators form a central theme in these phases and a list thereof drives information 
collection requirements to help analysts forecast identified indicators. There are similarities 
between Khalsa’s proposed framework and that of Bodnar’s discussed below, as well as that 
of Pirolli and Card’s notional model of intelligence analysis. The core of these similarities 
also centre on an “information foraging” phase and a “sensemaking” phase. Khalsa’s 
framework, however, ties into Grabo’s emphasis on indicators, which again highlights the 
concept of creating expectations. 
                                                                                                                                                        
46 Marrin, S 2009. Intelligence analysis and decision-making: methodological challenges. In Gill, P Marrin, S 
and Phythian, M (eds.) Intelligence Theory. Key questions and debates. Studies in Intelligence series. 
Routledge. London. (Kindle edition) 
47 Heuer, RJ 1999. The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Centre for the Study of Intelligence: Central 
Intelligence Agency. 
48 Khalsa, S 2009. The Intelligence Community Debate over Intuition versus Structured Technique (75-86) 
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Table 1- Seven Phases of the Intelligence-Warning Process with Corresponding Essential Elements49  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Khalsa, S 2009. The Intelligence Community Debate over Intuition versus Structured Technique (75-86) 
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2.2.2 Boshoff’s differences between early warning and intelligence 
Concurrent with the intelligence cycle and analysis debates is a discussion involving the 
differences between early warning and traditional intelligence systems. Boshoff50 has 
outlined the differences between early warning and traditional intelligence systems as 
depicted in the table 2 below: 
Table 2 - Boshoff's Differences between Early Warning and Traditional Intelligence51 
Early Warning Traditional Intelligence Systems 
Depends on the collection and analysis of 
information, scenario-building and the 
presentation of recommendations to decision-
makers 
Depends also on the collection and analysis of 
information, scenario-building and the 
presentation of recommendations to decision-
makers 
Focuses on human security Focuses on state security 
Seeks to serve larger objectives than those of the 
state stricto sensu 
Seeks to serve state interest 
Depends on transparent methods and sharing of 
information 
Rely on secrecy, situation rooms and encrypted 
communications of classified information 
Transparency in information and analysis Closed system 
Decentralized and dependent upon other sources 
of information and analysis 
Centralized and dependent on in-house 
information and analysis 
 
However, Boshoff’s differentiation is from within a conflict early warning perspective where 
there are sovereignty concerns and various non-governmental organisations providing early 
warning monitoring services. Perry52 is critical of the perception of proponents of the 
conflict-based view of early warning that intelligence involves only secrecy and national 
interest. He views this misperception as troubling as it seriously damages the universality of 
intelligence’s utility. Perry emphasises the interdisciplinary nature of warning intelligence 
                                                 
50 Boshoff, H 2003. Meeting the challenge of conflict prevention in Africa… (6) 
51 Boshoff, H 2003. Meeting the challenge of conflict prevention in Africa… (6) 
52 Perry, BE 2008. Fast and Frugal Conflict Early Warning in Sub-Saharan Africa: The role of Intelligence 
Analysis (5-11)  
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and cites Laur53 in that the primary role of warning intelligence is “to aid the decision maker 
in avoiding surprise.” In concurrence with Perry’s view, is the fact that various sources of 
information are at play within the intelligence cycle. Not all sources are necessarily covert in 
nature. The separation is artificial as covert sources are merely a different type of information 
source not necessarily available to non-state actors. 
2.2.3 Models of early warning 
In terms of expanding on the various sub-sections of the intelligence flow, Peter Pirolli and 
Stuart Card54  have devised a model by employing cognitive task analyses55 to map out the 
process intelligence analysts follow during the analytical phase of the cycle. See below. 
 
Figure 2 – Pirolli & Cards’ notional model of intelligence analysis56 
They found evidence that intelligence analysts use schemata in order to represent information 
“coming in” to the analysis environment. Their model specifically emphasises the role of 
                                                 
53 Laur, TM 1986. Principles of Warning Intelligence. (151) as cited in Perry, BE. 2008 Fast and Frugal Conflict 
Early Warning in Sub-Saharan Africa: The role of Intelligence Analysis. (6) 
54 Pirolli, P & Card, S 2005. Sensemaking processes and leverage points… (1-6) 
55 Mitello & Hutton (1998: 1618) define cognitive task analysis as a “set of methods for identifying cognitive 
skills, or mental demands, needed to perform a task proficiently.” It is a technique to gather information 
about knowledge, thought processes and goal structures by studying and capturing information about both 
the overt observable behaviour and covert cognitive functions of individuals whilst executing of a task 
(Chipman Et al. 2000: 3) 
56 Pirolli, P & Card, S 2005. Sensemaking processes and leverage points… (2) 
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“schematic knowledge structures built for expertise and experience” which allows an analyst 
to make sense of a situation and determine adequate courses of action.57 
Pirolli and Russell58 have recently categorised sensemaking into three perspectives or groups: 
(1) the representation construction model of sensemaking, (2) the data/frame perspective of 
sensemaking, and (3) the collaborative sensemaking perspective. The representation 
construction model is central to the field of human computer interaction (HCI). In essence, it 
represents a model that explains the formational process and the working of external 
knowledge representations facilitating insight and action. Pirolli and Card’s notional model of 
analyst sensemaking depicted in figure 2 on page 14, falls under this perspective. 
Sensemaking is seen as a “process of shaping representations [that may] be understood in 
terms of its effects on changing the knowledge available to humans interacting with 
computers.” The data flow is transformational in that: (1) the information from its “raw” state 
is transformed via “expertise” and then (2) it is transformed again into a form that is 
appropriate for communication. Russell Et al.59 recognise four main processes, (1) searching 
for representational structures or schemata that can organise information, (2) creating 
instances of these representations, (3) modification of the representations, and (4) use of 
representations in performing tasks. There is a sense of linearity implied although Pirolli and 
Russell highlight iterative loops in the process. 
Going forward in this thesis the representation construction model of sensemaking will be 
referred to as “sense-making” and it is not compared to Weick’s theory of sensemaking 
which is closer to the data/frame and collaborative perspective and represented by the term 
“sensemaking.” 
The model as depicted in figure 2, contains two loops, a foraging loop and a sense-making 
loop. The foraging loop defines processes centred on information seeking, filtering, 
extraction and reading. The sense-making loop involves iterative development of a “mental 
model from the schema that best fits the evidence”60 or a representational schema.61 
Information processing as depicted in figure 2 can be driven as a top-down hypothesis testing 
                                                 
57 Pirolli, P & Card, S 2005. Sensemaking processes and leverage points… (1-6) 
58 Pirolli, R Russell, DM 2011. Introduction to Special issue… (3-5) 
59 Russell Et al. 1993. The cost structure of sensemaking (1-9) 
60 Pirolli, P & Card, S 2005. Sensemaking processes and leverage points… (2) 
61 Pirolli, P & Russell, DM 2011. Introduction to this special issue on Sensemaking (3) 
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process or a bottom-up exploratory process.62 Pirolli and Card63 posit that their analysis 
suggests that top-down and bottom-up processes are invoked in an adaptable manner. 
Furthermore, they state that the dataflow in the model represents an information 
transformation from a raw state to one where know-how and expertise may be applied, as 
well as those formats suitable for communication.64 
In addition, and of specific interest, is their statement that sense-making represents a process 
of shaping representations which can be understood “in terms of its effects on changing the 
knowledge available to humans interacting with computers and changing the computational 
cost structure of accessing and using that knowledge.”65 In the model, processes and data are 
arranged by degree of effort as a measurement of: (1) the amount of time required, (2) 
number of operations or overall cost of processing, and (3) the degree of structure. In 
development of this model, Pirolli and Card were interested in intelligence analysis involving 
massive amounts of data. Taking a massive amount of data into account, they identified 
various time based leverage points concerning the foraging loop in particular: 
- Thorough exploration of an information environment ensures that the missing of 
salient elements of the data is limited, but working through it has a temporal cost. 
- Analysts spend considerable time scanning data as well as seeking and assessing the 
relevance of entities. 
- The time taken in shifting attentional control to a new information domain is usually 
costly. 
- Additional time is spent on follow-up searches as extracted information generates new 
questions. 
                                                 
62 An argument can be made that the two loops of Pirolli and Card’s model (foraging and sense-making) has its 
roots in Wallace’s “Wheel of Science” (Wallace: 1971; Babbie: 2013). This is in essence a cycle between 
deductive and inductive reasoning from an analyst’s perspective. The top down approach in the Pirolli and 
Card  model would be akin to an experienced analyst being able to posit hypotheses regarding a problem 
situation and then search for information to either refute or support postulated hypotheses. A bottom up 
approach would reign when an analyst first has to investigate a problem statement before being able to posit 
hypotheses about a situation. Seasoned analysts would most likely follow a top down approach and novices a 
bottom-up. This is due to the reason that a senior analyst can draw on more elaborate frames and a larger 
repertoire of frames. 
63 Pirolli, P & Card, S 2005. Sensemaking processes and leverage points… (2) 
64 Pirolli, P & Russell, DM 2011. Introduction to this special issue on Sensemaking (4) 
65 Pirolli, P & Russell, DM 2011. Introduction to this special issue on Sensemaking (4) 
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In terms of the sense-making loop, leverage points are associated with problem structuring, 
which according to Pirolli and Card66 encompass hypothesis generation, evidentiary 
reasoning and decision making. These leverage points are affected by cognitive biases such 
as the inherent capacity limits of human working memory, human perceptional biases 
towards interpretation of information into existing schemata, as well as expectations and 
confirmation bias. Human analytical biases67 such as availability, hindsight bias, black swans 
and anchoring are well documented and a full description thereof falls outside of the scope of 
this thesis.  
Similarly, John Bodnar68 proposed an equivalent to Pirolli and Card’s model regarding how a 
warning analyst builds an assessment. The essence of Bodnar’s model (from the analyst’s 
point of view) is a collection and information cycle which he places within Boyd’s 
Observation – Orientation – Decision – Action cycle (OODA loop).69 The effect of the 
knowledge economy and its accompanying complexity is a central feature in Bodnar’s efforts 
to provide a model for analysis in the intelligence warning environment and to argue for a 
shift away from the deterministic paradigm. Bodnar’s model is depicted in figure 3 on page 
18. 
                                                 
66 Pirolli, P & Card, S 2005. Sensemaking processes and leverage points… (4-5) 
67 Yudkowsky, E 2008. Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgements of Global Risks (91-119) 
68 Bodnar, J 2003. Warning Analysis for the information Age… (132) 
69 Bodnar, J 2003. Warning Analysis for the information Age… (51 - 71) 
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Figure 3 - Bodnar's Model - From Hypotheses to Assessment70 
The massive availability of data in the analysis process of early warning systems, as well as 
the characteristics of big data, that of volume, variety and velocity is problematic.71 Big data 
is beyond the ability of legacy database software tools to manage, store and analyse - specific 
new software tools are necessary to deal with it.  
 
                                                 
70 Bodnar, J 2003. Warning Analysis for the information Age… (132) 
71 Manyika Et al. 2011. Big data: the next frontier for innovation, competition, and productivity, McKinsey 
Global Institute Report, New York, NY 
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2.3 Section Two – Software within warning analysis: Visual Analytics  
Thomas and Cook,72 taking Bodnar and Pirolli and Card’s models into account, affirm that 
processes such as gathering, finding and extracting information, and re-representing it for 
analysis has a cost. This cost may be considered in terms of time investment, level of 
difficulty, and resource requirements. Hence, they argue that Visual Analytics, in particular 
the capabilities of information visualisation and computational data analysis as applied to 
analytical reasoning, can support the so called “sense-making loop” within these models.  
Specifically how information visualisation augments human cognitive capabilities in the 
following ways: 
- It increases cognitive resources by using visualization of data to expand memory. 
- It reduces searching by representing a large amount of information in a small space. 
- By enhancing the recognition of patterns in time and space. 
- It supports the easy perceptual interpretation of relationships. 
- By perceptual monitoring of numerous potential events. 
- By provisioning of a workspace that may be manipulated interactively enables the 
exploration of parameter values. 
Visual Analytics could thus facilitate the process points along Pirolli and Card’s model 
(figure 2) and enhance the scale and effectiveness of analyst schemata. The cost structures 
associated with this notional model of intelligence analysis can be reduced through Visual 
Analytics by, (1) transforming information into forms that allow for more effective cognitive 
processing, and (2) enabling software to help with filtering, representation translation and 
interpretation of information. 
2.3.1 Visual Analytics – dealing with large datasets in early warning analysis 
In the aftermath of 9/11 the founding of the National Visualization and Analysis Centre 
(NVAC™) of the US Department of Homeland Security in 2004 had a profound effect on the 
establishment of Visual Analytics as a scientific discipline.73 This was followed in 2005 with 
                                                 
72 Thomas, JJ & Cook, KA  2005. Illuminating the Path (46-47) 
73 Kielman Et al. 2009. Foundations and frontiers in Visual Analytics (239) 
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the release of Illuminating the Path74 that served as a roadmap of sorts for the development of 
Visual Analytics as a science.  
Visual Analytics is defined in Illuminating the Path as the “science of analytical reasoning 
facilitated by interactive visual interfaces.”75 It was largely a response to the challenges of 
analysing overwhelming amounts of disparate, conflicting and dynamic information to 
prevent and respond to emerging terror threats and attacks and to protect the United States 
border. Visual Analytics is a multi-disciplinary field that includes: 
- Analytical reasoning techniques  
- Visual representations and interaction techniques 
- Data representations and transformation 
- Techniques supporting the production, presentation and dissemination of the results. 
According to Thomas and Cook76 the science of analytical reasoning provides the framework 
upon which to develop visual analytic technologies for the goal of: 
[Facilitating] this analytical reasoning process through the creation of software that 
maximizes human capacity to perceive, understand, and reason about complex and 
dynamic data and situations. It must build upon an understanding of the reasoning 
process, as well as an understanding of underlying cognitive and perceptual 
principles, to provide mission-appropriate interactions that allow analysts to have a 
true discourse with their information. The goal is to facilitate high-quality human 
judgment with a limited investment of the analysts’ time. 
Similarly, Keim Et al.77 confirm the central role that the concept of the “information overload 
problem” has played in the development of Visual Analytics as a science. They refer to this 
problem as “getting lost” in data that is irrelevant to the task at hand and inappropriately 
processed and presented. Accordingly, they see the overarching driving vision of Visual 
Analytics as turning information overload78 into an opportunity and its goal to make data and 
                                                 
74 Thomas, JJ & Cook, KA (eds.) 2005. Illuminating the Path -The Research and Development Agenda for 
Visual Analytics. IEEE.  http://nvac.pnl.gov/docs/RD_Agenda_VisualAnalytics.pdf, accessed 2010-09-23 
75 Thomas, JJ & Cook, KA 2005. Illuminating the Path (4) 
76 Thomas, JJ & Cook, KA 2005. Illuminating the Path (6) 
77 Keim Et al. 2008. Visual Analytics: Definition, Process, and Challenges (154-154) 
78 Information load is most often referred to in management literature as “information overload.” Li & Li (2011: 
49) and Speier Et al. (1999:337) refer to information overload as the anxiety and fatigue that a person 
experiences while not having the capacity to deal with the information and state that the concept has its roots 
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information processing “transparent for an analytical discourse”. Central to this idea is: (1) 
the management and difficulties associated with very large data sets, (2) the ability to 
combine individual data handling steps into the visual analytic “pipeline,” and (3) creating 
interactive visualisations optimized for efficient human perception. 
Keim Et al.79 also provide an important distinction between Visual Analytics and information 
visualisation. Whilst they are closely related and there is some overlap, visualisation does not 
necessarily deal with analytical tasks or advanced data analysis algorithms. Where 
information visualisation focuses on the process of producing views and creating interaction 
techniques for a specific class of data, Visual Analytics focuses on data analytics from the 
start - an approach combining decision-making, visualisation, human factors and data 
analysis. 
Recently, Kohlhammer Et al.80 provided a slightly updated definition of Visual Analytics, in 
that it “combines automated analysis techniques with interactive visualizations for an 
effective understanding, reasoning and decision making on the basis of very large and 
complex datasets.” They expand on this by stating that Visual Analytics is the creation of 
tools and techniques to: 
- Synthesise information and derive understanding from massive, dynamic, ambiguous, 
and conflicting data. 
- Detect the expected and discover the unexpected. 
- Provide timely, sound, and understandable assessments. 
- Communicate these assessments effectively for action. 
The emphasis in the process, as illustrated by figure 4 on page 22, is a combination of 
automatic and visual analysis methods fused by human interaction to derive knowledge from 
                                                                                                                                                        
in cognitive psychology. Eppler & Mengis (2003: 7-15) have argued that everyday use of the term 
information overload has led to additional constructs such as cognitive overload, sensory overload and 
information fatigue syndrome.  In addition, they provide five key contributors to information overload; (1) 
information processing capacity, (2) organizational design, (3) the nature of the information, (4) the person 
processing the information, and (5) information technology. Eppler and Mengis (2003) provide a detailed 
literature study of information overload and the reader is directed to this paper for a detailed review. 
However, it should be noted that some researchers, such as Schwartz Et al. (1986:227-303), posit that the 
term information overload is a myth in the sense that individuals “satisfice” and make do with what they can 
to make a decision. They state that when “choice [or information]sets become large or choice tasks complex 
relative to consumers' time or skill, consumers satisfice rather than optimize” (Schwartz Et al., 1986:301). 
79 Keim Et al. 2008. Visual Analytics: Definition, Process, and Challenges (158) 
80 Kohlhammer Et al. 2011. Solving problems with Visual Analytics (118) 
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the given data. The authors posit that Shneiderman’s81 adage for information visualisation 
“Overview first, zoom/filter, details on demand” is replaced with the Visual Analytics adage 
“Analyse first, show the important, zoom/filter, analyse further, details on demand.” 
 
Figure 4 - Visual Analytics Process82 
The essence here is that it is not sufficient to just retrieve and display data using 
visualisations. Apart from the visualisation, it is necessary to analyse the data according to its 
value of interest, relevance and to provide interaction models to get details of the data on 
demand. It is from within this perspective that Keim Et al. state that “the user has to be the 
ultimate authority in giving direction of the analysis along his or her specific task.” 83 
2.3.2 Analytical models in Visual Analytics 
In order to advance the science of analytical reasoning in support of Visual Analytics, 
Thomas and Cook recommend that it has to “build upon theoretical foundations of reasoning, 
sense-making, cognition, and perception to create visually enabled tools to support 
collaborative analytic reasoning about complex and dynamic problems.”84 However, 
Ribarsky, Fisher and Pottenger85 stated in 2009 that there has been a relative lack of inquiry 
                                                 
81 Shneiderman, B 1996. The Eyes have it: A task by data type taxonomy… (336–343) 
82  Kohlhammer Et al. 2011. Solving problems with Visual Analytics (118) 
83 Keim Et al. 2008. Visual Analytics: Definition, Process, and Challenges (156) 
84 Thomas, JJ  & Cook, KA  2005. Illuminating the Path (63) 
85 Ribarsky, W Fisher, B Pottenger, WM 2009. Science of analytical reasoning (255) 
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into the design and evaluation of systems that assist human cognitive processing from within 
a Visual Analytics perspective. This may be due to a lack of communication between 
visualisation researchers and cognitive scientists whose methods may elucidate analytic 
cognition in complex visual environments. Apart from Pirolli and Card’s model, there are a 
number of models proposed by various authors such as Van Wijk,86 as to how analysts make 
sense of data through the interactive visualisations provided by Visual Analytics. 
2.3.2.1 Van Wijk’s model of visualisation 
Authors like Keim Et al.87 however, warn about a naïve assumption that visualisation can 
offer a “first seen” or “virgin” view on data. They state that it is inevitable that any 
representation will favour an interpretation over other possibilities. Accordingly, in their 
view, Visual Analytics provides a solution to this by enabling the user to “enter into a loop 
where data can be interactively manipulated to help gain insight both on the data and the 
representation itself.” They base this on the sense-making loop for Visual Analytics derived 
from Van Wijk’s88 simple model of visualisation illustrated in figure 5 on page 24. 
Van Wijk89 proposes that data are transformed according to a specification into a time 
varying image. The data may be both structured and unstructured. The specification includes 
a hardware specification, applied algorithms and specific application parameters. The image 
is perceived by the user resulting in a new insight or increase in knowledge. The amount of 
knowledge acquired is dependent on (1) the image, (2) the current knowledge of the user, and 
(3) the particular properties of perception and cognition of the user. Knowledge influences the 
process in a sense that an engineer or subject matter expert will extract more information than 
a layperson or novice. In terms of perception, some individuals are more adept at spotting 
trends and patterns. For instance, a colour-blind person will be less effective in extracting 
knowledge out of a colourful visualisation. The interactive exploration and analyses of the 
image results in adaptation of the specification, which has the effect of updating the initial 
knowledge.  
                                                 
86 Van Wijk, JJ 2005. The Value of Visualization (80) 
87 Keim Et al. 2008. Visual Analytics: Definition, Process, and Challenges (164) 
88 Van Wijk, JJ 2005. The Value of Visualization (80) 
89 Van Wijk, JJ 2005. The Value of Visualization (80) 
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Figure 5 - Van Wijk’s model90 
The choice of the initial representation will be dependent on statistical or mathematical 
techniques such a link analysis or spatio-temporal analysis. The process then enters a cycle 
where the user can gain knowledge of the data. By interacting and “drilling down” into the 
visual representation a better understanding of the visualisation itself is gained. This enables a 
flow of iterations that occur through various representations, which ultimately results in the 
confirmation or refutation of hypotheses built from previous iterations.91  
Illustrated in the diagram on page 25 is Van Wijk’s process in conjunction with the use 
process of the Starlight®92 Visual Analytics software suite. It illustrates how the product’s 
software process conforms to Van Wijk’s visualisation model.  
                                                 
90 Keim Et al. 2008. Visual Analytics: Definition, Process, and Challenges (165) 
91 Keim Et al. 2008. Visual Analytics: Definition, Process, and Challenges (165) 
92 Starlight VIS – Future Points Systems, http://www.futurepointsystems.com  
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Figure 6 - Van Wijk's process relative to Starlight® Visual Analytics Software's use process93  
 It is important to note that Van Wijk94 is clear in his position that extraction of knowledge 
from data is a subjective process. Increasing knowledge using visualisation depends on the 
data, the specification used, and the perceptual skills and prior knowledge of the user. Based 
on knowledge gained from the image (representation) the user can thus change the 
specification of the visualisation in order to explore the data further. 
2.3.2.2 Adaptations of Van Wijk’s model 
Green Et al.95 builds on Van Wijk’s process of the user perceiving an image and utilising a 
specification in exploration. They posit that it is difficult to separate “knowledge” from the 
reasoning process that created it. Accordingly, a user or individual’s knowledge is not a 
collection of declarative facts but also includes inferential or relational semantic meaning, 
perceived value, and factual reasoning in relation to these facts. This reasoning power to 
manipulate facts therefore leads Green Et al.96 to include a “cognition” process to Van Wijk’s 
visualisation model as illustrated in figure 7 on page 26. 
                                                 
93 RJ Goosen, self-constructed based on Starlight use process 
94 Van Wijk, JJ 2005. The Value of Visualization (82) 
95 Green Et al. 2008. Visual Analytics for complex concepts… (94) 
96 Green Et al. 2008. Visual Analytics for complex concepts… (94) 
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Figure 7 - Van Wijk’s Model with Green Et al. integrations in red97  
They argue that the knowledge required to determine which methods to use when integrating 
new knowledge with old, has to be considered within Van Wijk’s process. Hence, the 
inclusion of a perception, knowledge and exploration cycle as illustrated in figure 7 above. In 
Green Et al.’s model the P relates to perception, K to knowledge and E to exploration and 
analyses as illustrated in Van Wijk’s model (figure 5) above. Perception, knowledge, and 
exploration are thus modelled as cognitive processes informing each other. Green Et al.98 see 
perception (P) as an early cognitive process of selective attention, categorisation, 
accommodation, and perceptual logic. Knowledge (K) represents meaningful knowledge 
utilising reasoning and problem solving in the creation thereof. Exploration (E) represents a 
focussed interactive cognitive process using perception (P) and knowledge (K). These 
additions to Van Wijk’s model emphasise the important role perception and logic play in 
exploration as well as how a cycle of interaction fuels knowledge reasoning. This exploration 
and learning directs and focuses the attention of continued data exploration. 
Wang Et al.99 have applied Van Wijk’s model as a basis to extend Nonaka and Takeuchi’s100 
knowledge conversion model and applied it to interactive visualisation. From a visualisation 
perspective, internalisation parallels the insight discovery process in that “visually 
                                                 
97 Green Et al. 2008. Visual Analytics for complex concepts… (94) 
98 Green Et al. 2008. Visual Analytics for complex concepts… (94) 
99 Wang Et al. 2009. Defining and applying knowledge conversion processes… (616-623) 
100 Nonaka, I & Takeuchi, H 1995. The knowledge Creating Company 
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representing explicit knowledge would support analysts in understanding and transforming 
the explicit knowledge into tacit (internal) knowledge.” In addition, they state that tacit 
knowledge derived from a representation or image can also be externalized by way of 
visualisation and stored in a knowledge base, effectively creating explicit knowledge.101 The 
authors attempt to delineate tacit and explicit knowledge as well as provide a mechanism to 
experience this tacit-explicit interaction through interactive visualisation. They posit that 
explicit knowledge is different from data or information and that tacit knowledge results from 
human cognitive processing. Specifically, Wang Et al. state that explicit knowledge exists in 
data and is independent from the user or his/her tacit knowledge.102 
In terms of Visual Analytics, they state that explicit knowledge is extracted from data and 
information and represented in a visualisation. A user then receives this visualisation 
perceptually and cognitively which in turn increases the user’s tacit knowledge. Accordingly, 
cognitive processing is responsible for understanding and an increase in tacit knowledge – 
thus recursively affecting subsequent perception and cognition. It is the user’s tacit 
knowledge that directs the user’s interaction and exploration of the visualisation.  
Wang Et al.,103 in referencing Van Wijk’s model, believe that the knowledge the user gains is 
tacit and depends on the image and the current knowledge state of the user. Furthermore, they 
believe that the amount of explicit knowledge that exits in a dataset (to be 
visualised/represented via a specification) “could be nearly infinite [and may] be expressed 
and stored in a knowledge base (KB) as a collection of smaller knowledge artefacts.” This 
knowledge base could be represented by any system that stores information or data via an 
“ontological knowledge structure” for example, an SQL104 database or content management 
system. This is illustrated on page 28 in their representation of Van Wijk’s model, where 
explicit knowledge elements (Ke1….Ken) are stored in a knowledge base structure for use in 
the visualisation process. 
                                                 
101 Wang Et al. 2009. Defining and applying knowledge conversion processes… (618) 
102 Wang Et al. 2009. Defining and applying knowledge conversion processes… (617) 
103 Wang Et al. 2009. Defining and applying knowledge conversion processes… (617) 
104 Structured Query Language 
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Figure 8 - Knowledge base incorporated in Van Wijk's model105  
Visual Analytics is important from an early warning perspective in that warning analysts 
operate within a Multi-INT106 environment where large data volumes are a reality. It is within 
this data and information environment that warning analysts have to notice indicators and 
signals that may provide clues to impending threats, opportunities and changes within the 
environment. Visual Analytics thus sets out to provide a software tool in support of the 
notional models of intelligence and warning analysis as depicted by Pirolli and Card and 
Bodnar. Therefore, the end goal of Visual Analytics is to enable analysts to recognise signals, 
cues, patterns, trends and anomalies in large datasets.  
2.4 Section Three - Signals and cues in warning system analysis 
In addition to the use of Visual Analytics as a software support tool in the warning analysis 
process, Cavelty and Mauer107 have argued for a more reflexive intelligence perspective to 
warning in the current threat environment. They state that a growing part of the intelligence 
community realises that changing context “has significant consequences for strategic early 
warning methodologies and methods.” In specific they evaluate two distinct types of warning 
methodology: warning and discovery. From their perspective, predicting or forecasting 
                                                 
105 Wang Et al. 2009. Defining and applying knowledge conversion processes 
106 Multi Source Intelligence – Signals, Human, Geospatial, Imagery, Open Source, Measurement and Signature 
107 Cavelty, MD & Mauer, V 2009. Postmodern Intelligence: Strategic warning… (129-133) 
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methodologies encompass trends and patterns, frequency and probability. However, 
discovery is an altogether different domain - “strategic early warning is based on the 
assumption that discontinuities do not emerge without warning.” They state that warning 
signs have been described as weak signals and the management of “unknown unknowns” 
makes it necessary to gather “weak signals.” According to them, one approach to “maximize” 
weak-signal detection in a complex system is horizon scanning together with engaging in 
systematic probing strategies.108 
The concept of “weak signals” provides a nexus between the business strategy and the formal 
intelligence environment. Schwartz in providing a theoretical model of a Strategic Early 
Warning System (SEWS) posits that discontinuities do not emerge without warning and these 
warning signs can be described as “weak signals.” Detecting weak signals are achieved via 
environmental scanning.109 Schwarz derives the ideal SEWS process from Liebl who 
describes this process in three distinct phases110: an information gathering phase followed by 
a diagnosis and strategy formulation phase. Schwarz’s theoretical model is similar to Pirolli 
and Card’s model – both have a foraging/information gathering component and a sense-
making/diagnosis component. Brief overviews of the different phases are provided but not in 
the same level of detail as that of Bodnar or Khalsa above. 
 
Figure 9 - SEWS Process111  
This systematic scanning follows either an outside-in (a 360 degree focus) or an inside-out 
(management determines fields of interest) approach. Brouard defines this scanning phase as 
                                                 
108 Cavelty, MD & Mauer, V 2009. Postmodern Intelligence: Strategic warning… (137) 
109 Schwarz, JO 2005. Pitfalls in implementing a strategic early warning system (22-23) 
110 Schwarz, JO 2005. Pitfalls in implementing a strategic early warning system (24) 
111 Schwarz, JO 2005. Pitfalls in implementing a strategic early warning system 
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informational processes through which an organization stays “attuned” to or cognisant of its 
environment in order to facilitate decision making and action to achieve its goals and 
objectives.112 Recently, authors, such as Franco Et al.113 and Ramirez Et al.,114 have 
associated environmental scanning with competitive intelligence. Brouard also makes this 
association and posits that environmental scanning includes three components, that of input 
(needs of users), cycle and output. He equates the “cycle” with the intelligence cycle as 
discussed previously. 
“In-depth analysis” is included in Liebl’s second phase, but this is not unpacked by the author 
nor expanded on to provide a thorough description of what it entails. However, analytical 
tools such as scenario planning,115 SWOT analysis,116 Porter’s Five Forces117 and other 
structured techniques are normally utilised during the analytical phase. 
Bodnar’s assertion stated earlier, that warning is “[a] prediction of the future that matches 
past and current indicators with a model of the Future”118 is well worth emphasising as it 
resonates heavily through the rest of this thesis. It reflects on recognising and noticing signals 
or cues in the environment and the resulting sense to be made. Consequently, it is necessary 
to investigate how signals and weak signals are conceptualised within the literature.  
2.4.1 Conceptualisations of weak signals  
Igor Ansoff formally introduced his concept of weak signals in his 1975 paper Managing 
strategic surprise by response to weak signals119 and supplemented this with additional works 
in 1980120 and 1984.121 His development of the weak signals concept was a response to 
limitations he identified in the strategic planning approach of the 1970s, which according to 
Ansoff, could successfully deal with incremental developing historical trends, but not 
                                                 
112 Brouard, EF 2006. Development of an Expert System on Environmental Scanning Practices… (39-41) 
113 Franco Et al. 2011. Competitive intelligence: a research model tested on Portuguese firms (332-333) 
114 Ramirez Et al. 2013. Scenarios and early warnings as dynamic capabilities to frame… (825–838) 
115 Fink Et al. 2005. The future scorecard… (360-381); Wack, P 1985 Scenarios: shooting the rapids (139–150); 
Postma,T & Liebl, F 2005. How to improve scenarios as a strategic management tool? (161–173) 
116 Novicevic, M & Harvey, M 2004. Dual-perspective SWOT: a synthesis of marketing intelligence and 
planning (84-94) 
117 Porter, M 1980. Competitive Strategy (4) 
118 Bodnar, JM 2003. Warning analysis for the information age… (11) 
119 Ansoff, HI 1975. Managing strategic surprise by response to weak signals. California Management Review, 
18(2), (21-33) 
120 Ansoff, HI 1980. Strategic issues management, Strategic Management Journal, 1, (131-148) 
121 Ansoff, HI 1984. Implanting Strategic Management. Prentice-Hall International, London 
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surprise. Ansoff also introduced the concept of a strategic discontinuity, which is a future 
occurrence that shows a significant departure from the past or from some expected trend or 
extrapolation. In some circumstances, a discontinuity invariably leads to a strategic surprise, 
which is a sudden or rapid change usually culminating into a significant threat in a firm’s 
business environment.122 
Ansoff posits that signals that are “weak” foreshadow changes in an environment. These 
weak signals are vague harbingers of possible future change. As more related information 
progressively becomes available organisations are able to develop these signals further in 
order to make sense of them. In particular, Ansoff refers to weak signals as “imprecise early 
indications about impending impactful events.”123 This progressive nature is seen as: “[a] 
graduated response through amplification and response to weak signals.”124 
In relation to identifying these weak signals, Ansoff proposed a model of filters through 
which organisations can recognise them. Clues or phenomena from an environment have to 
pass through: (1) an observation/surveillance filter that defines a data observation or 
collection area, (2) a mentality/cognitive filter used to evaluate data that passed the 
surveillance filter for its relevance, and (3) a power filter that engages as power structures 
influence the meaning ascribed to a particular clue. Ansoff implied that this filter model 
allows humans to convert a supposed weak signal into usable knowledge in order to prevent 
some future threat.125 This conversion takes place as a graduated response to how the weak 
signals mature and become strong signals.126 
The filter model is one of the most enduring insights created by Ansoff according to 
Holopainen and Toivonen.127 They argue that the surveillance filter refers to the 
“observation” of the signal and the signal can only pass this filter if an actor or several actors 
have discovered the emerging signal. It has also been stated that in order to “effect the future, 
the signal has to traverse three filters.”128 This immediately begs the question: what about 
cues and signals that are not noticed (which lead to surprise and invariably affect some future 
                                                 
122 Ansoff, HI 1975. Managing strategic surprise (22)  
123 Ansoff, HI 1985. Conceptual underpinnings… (2) 
124 Ansoff, HI 1975. Managing strategic surprise (22-23) 
125 Ansoff, HI 1984. Implanting strategic management (510) 
126 Ansoff, HI 1985. Conceptual underpinnings… (12) 
127 Holopainen, M & Toivonen, M 2012. Weak signals: Ansoff today (199) 
128 Holopainen, M & Toivonen, M 2012. Weak signals: Ansoff today (199) 
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state of an environment)? Furthermore, they state that the mentality filter, in an environment 
undergoing a “discontinuous change,” invalidates historical success models and acts as a 
barrier or blocker of novel data. Therefore they posit that the situation then arises where 
“several individuals or organizations notice weak signals around them, but do not understand 
the importance of the signals because they rely on what has been learned in the past [my 
emphasis].”129 
Building on Ansoff’s work, Coffman contributed to the discourse of weak signals analysis in 
a series of papers in 1997.130  He defines weak signals as:  
- An idea or trend that will affect business and the business environment;  
- Something new or surprising from the signal receiver’s point of view although 
others may also perceive it;  
- Sometimes difficult to track down amid other noise and signals;  
- A threat or opportunity to an organisation;  
- Something that is often scoffed at by individuals who “know”;  
- Something that usually has a substantial lag time before it will mature and become 
mainstream;  
- Something that represents an opportunity to learn grow and evolve.  
The influence of Claude Shannon’s theory of information and JM Pierce’s Symbols, Signals 
and Noise131 becomes apparent in Coffman’s Part II discussion of weak signals.132  Shannon’s 
model of communication consists of five parts as illustrated on page 33.133 
                                                 
129 Holopainen, M & Toivonen, M 2012. Weak signals: Ansoff today (199) 
130 Coffman, B 1997. Weak Signal Research, Part I: Introduction, Journal of Transition Management, MG 
Taylor Corporation,  http://www.mgtaylor.com/mgtaylor/jotm/winter97/wsrintro.htm, accessed 2011-03-22. 
131 Pierce, JM 1969. Symbols, Signals and Noise: The nature and process of communication. Harper and 
Brothers, New York 
132 Coffman, B 1997. Weak Signal Research, Part II: Information Theory, Journal of Transition Management, 
MG Taylor Corporation, http://www.mgtaylor.com/mgtaylor/jotm/winter97/infotheory.htm, accessed 2011-
03-22 
133 Shannon, CE 1948. A mathematical theory of communication (7) 
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Figure 10 - Shannon's schematic diagram of a general communication system134  
 Coffman considers the effects that mental models have on the ability to perceive weak 
signals in an environment. He identifies three types of signals transmitted in our direction on 
a daily basis: (1) signals beyond our perception that we are incapable of receiving, (2) signals 
within our perception but unrecognised by our mental models, and (3) signals recognised by 
our mental models that we use to modify our behaviour. Drawing on Shannon and Pierce’s 
theories, Coffman posits that in order for organizations to notice weak signals our “sensory 
apparatus” or “mental models” need to be changed. In effect, our ability to notice weak 
signals is dependent on our ability to “know” or understand the “noise” in the transmission 
channel.  Although Coffman considers the effects of “mental models” on signal recognition, 
he embraces a mechanistic interpretation of Shannon’s theory in applying it to weak signal 
recognition.135 
As signals are passed or transmitted from source to receiver a methodology or approach to 
capture weak manifestations of signals effected by some arbitrary “noise source” is needed. 
In this regard, environmental scanning, as proposed by Francis Aguilar has provided a 
methodology to operationalize weak signal or early warning analysis in organisations. 
Aguilar defined the process of Environmental Scanning as: 
The activity of acquiring information [about] events and relationships in a 
company's outside environment, the knowledge of which would assist top 
management in its task of charting the company's future course of action.136  
                                                 
134 Shannon, CE 1948. A mathematical theory of communication (7) 
135 Coffman, B 1997.  Weak Signal Research, Part III: Sampling, Uncertainty and Phase Shifts in Weak Signal 
Evolution, Journal of Transition Management, MG Taylor Corporation, http://www.mgtaylor.com/ mg tay 
lor /jotm/winter97/wsrsampl.htm , accessed 2011-03-22  
136 Aquilar, FJ 1967. Scanning the business environment. New York, Macmillian (1) 
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Authors such as Meredith137 and, Kourteli138 have discussed the merits of deploying 
environmental scanning as a mechanism to monitor the environment for threats. Kourteli in 
particular has also highlighted the empirical weaknesses of Aguilar’s enunciation of 
environmental scanning. Kourteli states that Aguilar’s work has certain conceptual and 
empirical weaknesses in that it does not take into account the level of dynamic characteristics 
within an external environment. There is no concomitant recognition that different 
environments would need different processes of scanning.139 Consequently, Kourteli states 
that Aguilar’s scanning process is mechanistic because he implies that the scanning process 
may be improved by looking for better sources, kinds of information and ways of scanning.140 
This mechanistic approach as stated by Kourteli is evident in works such as that of Schultz 
where methodological improvements relative to the scanning process are advocated. 
Schultz’s focus is on the clear articulation of strategies to validate both scan sources and data 
in order to increase acceptance and usefulness.141 This mechanistic approach is also evident 
in earlier research such as that reported on by Correia and Wilson142 who examined factors 
influencing environmental scanning in an organisational context. Correia and Wilson argue 
that research in individual scanning activity has been manager centric and focused on: (1) 
identification of information sources used, (2) environmental sectors scanned, (3) scanning 
mode and methods, and (4) their influence and tasks performed on scanning activity. 
2.4.2 The Futures Studies view of weak signals 
Weak signals and environmental scanning have also received attention in Futures Studies 
research, notably by Day and Schoemaker,143 Mendonca Et al.,144  Hiltunen,145 Nikander and 
Eloranta146, Harris and Zeisler,147 and Choo.148 Futures Studies are dedicated to examining 
                                                 
137 Meredith, L 2007. Scanning for market threats (211–219) 
138 Kourteli, L 2000. Scanning the business environment (406-413) 
139 Kourteli, L 2000. Scanning the business environment (409) 
140 Kourteli, L 2000. Scanning the business environment (409) 
141 Schultz, WL 2006. The cultural contradictions of managing change… (11) 
142 Correia, Z & Wilson, TD 2001. Factors affecting environmental… Information Research 7(1)  
143 Day, GS & Shoemaker, PJH 2004. Driving through the fog: managing at the edge (127-142) 
144 Mendonca Et al. 2009. Venturing into the wilderness… (23-41) 
145 Hiltunen, E 2006. Was it a wildcard or just our blindness to change… (61-74) 
146 Nikander,  IO and Elorante, E 2001. Project management by early warnings  (385-399) 
147 Harris, DD & Zeisler, S 2002. Weak signals detecting the next best thing (21-29) 
148 Choo, CW 1999. The Art of Scanning the Environment (13-19) 
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future prospects in order to facilitate creative thinking about the future. The concept of weak 
signals (a key element of strategic issue management) and environmental scanning (a tool to 
achieve the identification of weak signals) creates the feedstock or seeding material for 
Futures Studies to pre-empt trends or likely future scenarios.149 However, in current Futures 
Studies research there are various interpretations regarding the nature and meaning of the 
term weak signal. As discussed previously the foundations are grounded in an Ansoffian-
Aguilarian framework in identifying and acting on so-called weak signals. Authors like 
Holopainen and Toivonen150 recognize that the concept of weak signals have been used “very 
loosely” and in a “confusing way” and have criticised the way in which “weak signals” are 
used in the production of reports requiring a view of up-and-coming trends in a specific 
environment. 
Holopainen and Toivonen151 discuss four main directions regarding the specification of the 
concept of weak signals: 
1) A more detailed and accurate definition of Ansoff’s “quite simple” definition of weak 
signals have been pursued by authors such as Coffman152 (see page 32-34) and 
Kamppinen Et al.153 Kamppinen and colleagues, according to Holopainen and Toivonen, 
formulated their definition along the same lines as that of Coffman. They see weak 
signals as individual events or a group of interrelated events. These events may not seem 
important or far-reaching when first noticed but may have far-reaching consequences for 
the future. However, it is not necessarily possible to connect the signal credibly with the 
upcoming event by statistical analysis. 
2) Attempts by some authors to separate or discriminate between the sign or phenomenon 
and the phenomenon itself. In this regard, the concept of a wild card is introduced where a 
weak signal is a sign of a future wild card (the phenomenon). Hiltunen154 takes this 
further by differentiating between situations where weak signals signpost wild cards or 
                                                 
149 Schwartz, JO 2005. Linking strategic issues… (39) 
150 Holopainen, M & Toivonen, M 2012. Weak signals: Ansoff today (204) 
151 Holopainen, M & Toivonen, M 2012. Weak signals: Ansoff today (200) 
152 Coffman, B 1997. Weak Signal Research, Part I: Introduction, Journal of Transition Management, MG 
Taylor Corporation,  http://www.mgtaylor.com/mgtaylor/jotm/winter97/wsrintro.htm , accessed 2011-03-22. 
153 Kappinen Et al. 2002. Futures Studies, Foundations and Directions 
154 Hiltunen, E 2006. Was it a wild card or just our blindness to gradual change? (61-74); Hiltunen, E 2008. The 
future sign and its three dimensions. (247-260) 
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gradual future change. She expands on this by drawing from semiotics and applying the 
triadic model of a sign as proposed by Pierce,155 which refers to the representamen (the 
form the sign takes), the object (emerging issue the sign indicates) and the interpretant 
(future potentiality of the sign). Furthermore, Hiltunen prefers the term “future sign” 
instead of weak signal.156 
3) Some researchers, also dispute the nature of “phenomena” which weak signals represent.  
There is unanimity that weak signals and wild cards are characterized by a sense of 
improbability. The dispute arises regarding the importance of the “phenomenon if it 
eventually occurs.”157 In this regard Mendonca Et al.158 and Mannermaa159 emphasise the 
large impact of effect, positive or negative, that the phenomena must represent if the 
initial signal is to qualify as a weak signal.  
4) The “managerial implication” view by Coffman160 and Mendonca Et al.161 Coffman posits 
that organisational strategy will include more risk and opportunity if weak signals are 
interpreted early and strategic action is executed based thereon. Mendonca Et al. 
scrutinise the nature of activities focused on detecting weak signals. They highlight 
organisational improvisation development by the use of futures orientated methods such 
as alternative scenarios. 
In addition to these four main directions, Holopainen and Toivonen also provide a 
synopsis of Ansoff’s thoughts and contribution to Futures Studies from a weak signal 
perspective, and is provided in table 3 on page 37. 
 
 
 
                                                 
155 Pierce, CS 1960. Collected Papers, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
156 Hiltunen, E 2008. The future sign and its three dimensions (247-260) 
157 Holopainen, M & Toivonen, M 2012. Weak signals: Ansoff today (200) 
158 Mendonca Et al. 2004. Wild cars, weak signals… (201-218) 
159 Maanermaa, M 2004. Heokoista Signaaleista Vahva Tulevaisuus, (Creating Strong Future with the Help of 
Weak Signals), WSOY, Porvoo as reported in, Holopainen, M & Toivonen, M 2012. Weak signals: Ansoff 
today (200) 
160 Coffman, B 1997. Weak Signal Research, Part I: Introduction, Journal of Transition Management, MG 
Taylor Corporation,  http://www.mgtaylor.com/mgtaylor/jotm/winter97/wsrintro.htm, accessed 2011-03-22. 
161 Mendonca Et al. 2004. Wild cars, weak signals… (201-218) 
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Table 3 – Adaptation of Holopainen & Toivonen’s Summary of weak signal studies – Ansoff’s original 
thoughts and the contributions of futures research162 
Study Areas Ansoff’s analyses Contributions of 
future studies 
Authors 
Definition of 
weak signal 
Weak signals are first 
symptoms of strategic  
discontinuities; they are 
symptoms of possible 
change in the future 
More detailed 
definitions - an event 
which may not seem 
important when it 
occurs, but may be 
crucial for the 
emergence of the 
future  
Kamppinen Et al. 2002  
Differentiating 
sign and 
phenomenon  
No explicit discussion, but 
the concepts of strategic 
discontinuities and strategic 
surprises refer to a 
difference between a weak 
signal and the phenomenon 
that it indicates 
Some authors argue 
that weak signals 
should be separated 
from ‘wild cards’, i.e. 
from phenomena that 
they indicate  
Mendonca Et al. 2004                                
Hiltunen,E 2006  
Nature of 
knowledge of 
weak signals  
First a sense of a 
threat/opportunity, then 
gradually increasing 
knowledge of its source, 
characteristics, necessary 
responses, and outcomes 
Adopting from 
semiotics the term 
‘interpretant’ to refer 
to the sense made of 
the future potentiality 
of the sign  
Hiltunen, E 2008  
Importance of 
phenomena that 
weak signals 
indicate  
The concept of strategic 
surprises restricts the 
phenomena to the important 
ones; however, Ansoff 
states that a weak signal 
may not be realized 
because it is ever perceived 
Some researchers 
restrict weak signals to 
important phenomena , 
others not  
Kamppinen Et al. 2002         
Mannermaa, M  2004            
Hiltunen, E 2006     
Kuusi Et al. 2000  
Managerial 
implications  
Ansoff’s main focus, 
including e.g. analysis of 
three progressive strategies: 
enhancing awareness, 
increasing flexibility, and 
directly attacking the threat 
or opportunity 
Additional notions: 
identification of one 
signal often leads to 
perceiving others; 
emphasis on the 
management system 
for wild cards  
Coffman, B 1997                                          
Mendonca Et al. 2004 
                                                 
162 Holopainen, M & Toivonen, M 2012. Weak signals: Ansoff today (202) 
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Weak signals in 
relation to other 
futures 
phenomena 
Discussion of differences 
between weak and strong 
signals  
Positioning weak 
signals in the context 
of futures studies, 
analysing their relation 
to strong signals, 
trends, megatrends etc.  
Kamppinen Et al. 2002                                   
Moijanen, M 2003                                  
Mannermaa, M  2004 
Sources of weak 
signals  
Ansoff named experts 
outside the firm and  
personnel with broad 
contacts inside the firm as 
relevant sources of weak 
signals, but did not discuss 
this topic in detail 
Moving outside one’s 
own context, eliciting 
opinions from people 
of different 
backgrounds, 
unofficial discussions, 
Internet and other 
media, ‘expert 
amateurs’  
Mannermaa, M  2004;                                                 
Day,G & Schoemaker,P. 
2004                                  
Hiltunen, E  2001  
Methods and 
tools for 
identifying weak 
signals 
Ansoff developed a 
systematic framework for 
identification of weak 
signals, but did not discuss 
in detail the methods and 
tools to be used in 
identification 
Systematic 
environmental 
scanning, expert 
opinions, Internet-
based tools that 
facilitate the choice of 
information, visual 
images ‘in the futures 
window’   
Decker Et al. 2005                                               
Ilmola, L &  Kuusi, O 
2006                       
Hiltunen. E 2007 
Skills needed in 
the mapping of 
weak signals 
Sensitivity, creativity, 
genuine interest and 
expertise are all needed 
Creativity and daring 
are essential. But 
expertise is also 
needed 
Kuusi, O 1999 
Factors hindering 
the perception of 
weak signals 
The idea of ‘filters’: 
surveillance, mentality and 
power filters 
Discussion and 
application of the 
‘filter theory’; 
‘paradigm blindness’ 
as a new concept  
Ilmola, L &  Kuusi, O 
2006                                                                             
Mannermaa, M  2004          
Empirical studies 
of weak signals 
Ansoff created a network of 
contacts to major 
corporations over the years 
to validate his  research. He 
consulted with Philips, 
General Electric and IBM 
to name a few 
Applications in many 
contexts, ranging from 
broad societal issues to 
the management of 
organizations and 
projects  
Nikander, O 2002;                                                        
Geerlings, H &  Rienstra, 
S 2003             
 
These different perspectives indicate that there is a level of ambiguity and issues of clarity in 
Futures Studies and other managerial disciplines as to what constitutes a weak signal as well 
as how to classify the effect and size of the future phenomenon that it is supposed to 
represent. Mendonca Et al. rely heavily on the work of Coffman and emphasise that weak 
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signals are information about the likelihood of an event with a low probability estimate and 
high impact uncertainty.163 In contrast, wild cards are defined as “incidents with perceived 
low probability of occurrence and with potentially high impacts and strategic 
consequences.”164 The difference lies in the certainty of high impact. Weak signals are seen 
as dispersed data that function as signposts to the appearance of a wild card. 
However, Mendonca Et al.165 refer to “surprise” and categorise surprise into: (a) imaginable 
surprises that are probable or improbable, (b) unimaginable surprise, and (c) certain surprise. 
They posit that surprise is negatively correlated with the ability to detect weak signals 
accurately. Consequently, they create a taxonomy of surprise in relation to weak signals and 
wildcards based around a PESTLE166 framework. The environment is divided-up into specific 
scanning sectors or pigeonholes. The interest here is “imaginability” of the surprise. This 
reference to the ability to imagine surprise would have the effect of the “imaginer” creating 
or altering current mental frameworks to allow for the identification of indicators to monitor 
for possible surprising events. 
2.4.3 Constructivist theories on weak signal conceptualisation 
The variety of different weak signal viewpoints may be linked to an attempt to define weak 
signals from within a nominal or reductionist perspective, consequently seeking a defined set 
of characteristics for the concept of a weak signal. Other avenues are being investigated in 
conceptualising weak signals. Authors such as Kaivo-oja167 have recently attempted to 
investigate alternative theoretical frameworks in support of weak signals such Nonaka’s 
SECI model and Boisot’s Information Space model in an effort to provide a more robust 
theoretical framework. Constructivist perspectives, four authors in specific, David Seidl,168 
Pierre Rossel,169 and Narayanan and Fahey,170 are questioning the conventional conceptual 
grounding of weak signal theory and discourse. These constructivist perspectives provide 
important insights into any future based projection and the open-ended nature of the future. 
                                                 
163 Mendonca Et al. 2004 Wild cars, weak signals… (205-206) 
164 Mendonca Et al. 2004 Wild cars, weak signals… (203) 
165 Mendonca Et al. 2004 Wild cars, weak signals…  (203) 
166 Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal and Environmental analysis framework 
167 Kaivo-oja, J 2012. Weak signal analysis, knowledge management… (206-217) 
168 Seidl, D 2004. The concept of Weak Signals Revisited… (151-168) 
169 Rossel, P 2009. Weak signals as a flexible framing space… (307-320) 
170 Narayanan, VK and Fahey, L 2004. Invention and navigation as contrasting metaphors… (38-57) 
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2.4.3.1 David Seidl 
Seidl argues that Ansoff’s concept of weak signals and the resulting literature that it sparked 
rests on epistemological assumptions which represent a “fairly naïve representationalist 
belief.”171 He argues that cognitions are conceptualised as direct representations of the 
outside world and that internal cognitions and reality are perceived as directly related. Weak 
signal literature, according to Seidl, is focused on whether signalling events in the 
environment are represented in the right place within the cognitive system and if they are 
understood as signals of impending strategic discontinuity. He views this as naïve and a 
contradiction in terms of what “is common knowledge about the essentially constructed 
nature of our cognitions.” Seidl draws from Tsoukas in terms of stating that the environment 
around us causes us to have beliefs, but the environment cannot tell us what to believe. He 
states that weak signals do not exist in the external environment, but rather that they need to 
be conceptualised cognitively “as cognitive phenomena, determined by the structures of the 
cognitive system.”172 
2.4.3.2 Pierre Rossel 
Similar to Seidl, Pierre Rossel173 states that the notion of a weak signal does not necessarily 
correspond to a real event but is “only a metaphor, building upon information theory” and 
“what we call a weak signal is usually not a direct warning message but, at best, a series of 
perceptions of issues, events and processes.” Rossel, in his critique of the Ansoffian tradition, 
poses three questions relating to weak signal analysis and early detection. The first is, “what 
is [the weak signal’s] relationship to change? The second, “what change does a weak signal 
represent or carry?” and thirdly, “how can any claim of weak signal identification be 
verified?” These three questions lead Rossel174 to state that current revisited neo-Ansoffian 
and past Ansoffian research traditions fail to take account of reflexivity.175 
                                                 
171 Seidl, D 2004. The concept of Weak Signals Revisited (156) 
172 Seidl, D 2004. The concept of Weak Signals Revisited (156) 
173 Rossel, P 2009. Weak signals as a flexible framing space (307-309) 
174 Rossel, P 2012. Early detection, warnings, weak signals… (234) 
175 Reflexivity according to Schwandt (2007:260), in a methodological sense, describes the process of critical 
self-reflection on one’s biases and theoretical predispositions and indicates that the enquirer is part of the 
context, setting and social phenomena under investigation.175 Schwandt (2007:260) states that reflexivity is 
an important procedure in establishing the validity of accounts of social phenomena. 
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In this light, Rossel176 criticises the current view that weak signals are influential isolated 
portions of reality that may be interpreted and then incorporated in strategy. The nature of 
current and past research is viewed as un-reflexive in that it does not account for the habits, 
models and assumptions for constructing weak signals out of a larger signal environment. 
According to Rossel weak signals are seen as if they “are objects within their own right, 
waiting to be discovered, instead of considering them as an expression of the paradigmatic 
capacity of the analyst.”177 Articulating this from within a constructivist perspective Rossel 
sees all weak signals as proposed by the Ansoffian perspective as “candidate weak signals, 
hypotheses or starting points for exploratory reflection.” 
The crux for Rossel in providing the reflexivity required is “making our assumptions explicit 
as possible,” and all these dimensions, together with the proviso that it is reflected upon, is 
defined as “a reflexive interrogation of one’s framing choices.”178 The issue here is that 
Rossel is trying to bring in an element of increasing the accuracy of identified weak signals 
by introducing reflexivity in the framing process so that “one can be confronted by ones’ own 
bias-producing capabilities.”179 
2.4.3.3 V.K. Narayanan and Liam Fahey 
Narayanan and Fahey state that “the future is a cognitive construction that must be conceived, 
imagined, or otherwise created as an explicit cognitive act by one or more individuals.”180 
They build upon the work of Nicholas Rescher181 and his view of epistemology, in specific 
his idea of conceptual idealism that offers an analytical framework to deal with how 
individuals construct the future. Accordingly, they state that any efforts to construct the 
future inevitably illicit questions of an epistemological nature. These questions are: (1) What 
provides confidence in our skill in scrutinising or looking into the future, and (2) if a level of 
confidence is attainable, what methodologies will enable us to do so? The future according to 
Narayan and Fahey is ontologically non-existent and thus a cognitive construction creating a 
situation where accuracy or assertions about the future can only be measured once the future 
has unfolded. The future can thus not exert any causal influence on the present. Complicating 
                                                 
176 Rossel, P 2009. Weak signals as a flexible framing space (312) 
177 Rossel, P 2009. Weak signals as a flexible framing space (312) 
178 Rossel, P 2011. Beyond the obvious: Examining ways  of consolidating early detection schemes (382) 
179 Rossel. P 2012. Early detection, warnings, weak signals… (235) 
180 Narayanan, VK & Fahey, L 2004. Invention and navigation as contrasting metaphors… (38) 
181 Rescher, N 1992. A System of Pragmatic Idealism, Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press  
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this further is that the future may be “cognitively inaccessible” due to deficient information. 
Visions or depictions of the future are thus not possible without the involvement of the 
human mind and thus will depend on our conceptual abilities, weaknesses, limitations and 
biases.182 
In looking at the future, the role of conceptual innovation is a key constituent element of 
Rescher’s framework. It emphasises the “critical need to engage in (re)conceptualisation: to 
continually reframe the world as we understand it.” Conceptual innovation creates an impetus 
to accept that finding or creating new data and information forces us to make an assessment 
as to “whether our long held concepts are adequate to describing and explaining the word 
around us.”183 In addition, Narayanan and Fahey state that Rescher distinguishes between 
mind involving and mind invoking. Mind involving is ever present, but mind invoking is the 
ability or capacity of the mind to invoke visions about the future, an ability to resort to 
assumptions, suppositions and hypotheses about the future. Importantly Narayanan and Fahey 
emphasise that this mind involved/mind invoked conception of the world around us is not 
egocentric or self-referential and therefore “inquirers” are never in a position to realise how 
our current conceptions are inadequate. This realisation is only possible based on 
retrospect.184 
Based on Rescher’s framework, Narayanan and Fahey propose using two metaphors for 
looking at the future, that of invention and navigation, as alternative modes of prediction185: 
1.) Invention sees the future as open and that it can be manipulated by human action. 
Mind involving is through induction and mind invoking though imagination. It is 
applicable in uncertain environments over long time frames. The emphasis here is 
strategic flexibility. 
2.) Navigation sees the future as patterned evolution that can be deterministic or 
probabilistic. Mind involving is through induction and extrapolation of data. 
“Mind-invokingness” is not present. As such, applicability is in dynamic 
environments over a medium time-frame and the emphasis is on technical and 
operational flexibility. 
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183 Narayanan, VK & Fahey, L 2004. Invention and navigation as contrasting metaphors… (42) 
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There are fundamental differences in the epistemological basis of invention and navigation. 
Narayanan and Fahey see these two metaphors for looking at the future as incommensurable 
and state that similar sounding tools such as scenario planning often mask this. They view the 
frequent use of “navigation” strategies in a turbulent context as misplaced, specifically “[the] 
capturing of signals from a diverse set of indicators, within an accepted world view.” 186 The 
resultant effect is the superficial understanding of the drivers of change, underlying 
connections between these drivers and the subsequent development of a limited integrated 
picture of turbulence in an environment. They are not convinced by the claims of “truth 
hood” made by the proponents of “navigation,” as the future, according to Rescher, is a 
cognitive construction of which the accuracy or truthfulness cannot be established.  
2.5 Implications  
Warning is an intangible abstraction that makes a prediction of the future. It is both a process 
and product of reasoning and logic, the validity of which can only be determined in hindsight. 
It is an assessment of probabilities of the future, one that matches past and current indicators 
with a model of the future. It is also steeped in action: the social act of conveying the warning 
to others such as decision makers. It is the product of an early warning process operating 
within an early warning system (EWS). This system is an initiative that harnesses a network 
of actors, resources, technologies, practices and organisational structures. The focus of which 
is the systematic collection, analysis and formulation of recommendations relating to the 
monitoring of an environment for the purpose of detecting and acting on opportunities, 
threats, discontinuities and preventing surprise. 
In addition, early warning systems are a highly complex mix of: (1) establishing indicators 
that signpost possible futures, (2) the collection of vast amounts of data and information 
about an environment to try and find indications of the indicators, (3) the application of 
specialized software to deal with big data and facilitate analytical reasoning, as well as, (4) 
the dissemination of the end result. The complex nature of this endeavour, together with the 
open-ended, unknowable187 and non-existent nature188 of the future, effects how warning 
systems, signals/signs, and software are used, and applied in warning systems.  
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Analytical models, such as Pirolli and Card’s notional model of analysis, centre around the 
shaping and construction of representations during a “waterfall like” transformational 
dataflow. This model represents the so-called representation construction model of 
sensemaking and is represented as “sense-making” in the rest of this thesis. In actuality this 
refers to the sense an analyst makes by inductive and deductive analysis while processing and 
analysing collected data. The nature of this model suggests a mechanistic description of the 
analysis process without really addressing the actual sensemaking process the analyst 
undergoes from a cognitive perspective. 
The cost structures associated with the notional model of analysis as well as 9/11 provided 
the impetus for Visual Analytics. As demonstrated earlier, reasoning models in Visual 
Analytics also focus on schematic knowledge structures or representational schemata that 
underlie interactive visualisations of large datasets. Variations on these models such as that of 
Van Wijk are based on the perspective or view of the researchers regarding the role of 
explicit and tacit knowledge. In essence, a large dataset is visualised based on a specification 
determined by algorithms, entity extraction, manipulation, and filtering – a significant 
amount of pre-structuring. In effect, Visual Analytics is a tool facilitating the sense-making 
of an warning analyst. 
There are very different interpretations relating to what constitutes a weak signal. The 
imprecise, nebulous, or vague state of the signal or sign when first noticed, is a common 
aspect of weak signals within the Ansoffian and neo-Ansoffian tradition. Interpretations vary 
between the “representationalist” paradigm and the “constructivist” paradigm. The 
representationalists see weak signals as cognitions that directly represent the environment, 
whilst constructivists see them as mere cognitive constructions determined by structures of 
our cognition. This conceptual variation effects the methodologies and processes in place to 
notice signals and cues in a warning environment, and adds an additional layer of complexity. 
Futures Studies has made a considerable contribution, but at the same time added its own 
issues.  This is especially evident, as an example, in statements relating to Ansoff’s filter 
model, where Holopainen and Toivonen189 posit that in order to effect the future a signal has 
to traverse Ansoff’s three filters. On the contrary, not noticing a sign, cue or weak signal 
certainly does not mean it won’t affect the future, it only means it was not noticed by the 
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analyst. In addition they propose that in some instances weak signals are noticed but not 
understood because of what has been learned in the past. The complex nature of predicting 
these “futures” and validating these predictions is by implication steeped in the past and only 
confirmable in hindsight.  
The ambiguity in research attempting to define weak signals may be linked to an attempt to 
define weak signals from within a nominal or reductionist perspective, consequently seeking 
a defined set of characteristics for the concept of a weak signal. Furthermore, warning 
systems do not only operate at the level of the individual. As soon as attempts are made to 
move from an individual level of analysis to that of the organisation, conceptual clarity 
becomes hazy. 
The constructivist paradigm represented by authors such as Seidl, Rossel and Narayanan and 
Fahey provide a bridgehead to Karl Weick’s theory of sensemaking, in particular the 
contribution the concept of framing can make to weak signal analysis and Visual Analytics. 
Elements of the sensemaking process are evident in these authors’ work: Seidl more so from 
an organisational perspective and Rossel focusing more on framing on the level of the 
individual. The notion of invention, by Narayanan and Fahey, also alludes to the belief-driven 
aspects of sensemaking as proposed by Weick. It is this overlapping between the individual 
and organisational level that makes Weick’s position different and compelling. 
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Chapter 3 
The Sensemaking Theory of Karl 
Weick 
What we wish, we readily believe, and what we ourselves think, we imagine others 
think also. – Julius Caesar (100-44B.C.)190 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a synopsis of Weick’s theory of sensemaking which is used as a 
guiding framework to compare and critically review the conceptual foundations of weak 
signal and early warning analysis, environmental scanning, and Visual Analytics. Whilst the 
essence of Weick’s theory is discussed it will zero in on Weick’s view of  frames and framing 
and the role this plays in the process of sensemaking.   
3.2 Weick’s sensemaking 
Karl Weick has contributed to the study of organizational science with three works in 
particular, The Social Psychology of Organizing191, Sensemaking in Organizations192 and, 
Making Sense of the Organization193. In his book Sensemaking in Organizations Weick 
describes and conceptualises sensemaking in terms of seven distinguishing characteristics 
that set it apart from interpretation and understanding. These characteristics are applied to 
organisational sensemaking and serve as a guide to sensemaking and how it works.194 His 
work relating to the seven properties of sensemaking has fostered a wealth of literature by 
researchers applying these seven properties as a framework in understanding organisational 
                                                 
190 Gaius Julius Caesar Quotes. (n.d.). Quotes.net. Retrieved at http://www.quotes.net/quote/22393, accessed 
2013-07-21 
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192 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations. Sage, California 
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events and crises.195 Scott and Barret196 have investigated strategic risk positioning as a 
sensemaking method in financial crises. Weick’s sensemaking has received attention in the 
investigation of environmental crises,197 mass shootings such as the Columbine school 
incident198 and the mapping of subjective risk in venture capital risk taking.199 
Sensemaking is about placing cues into frameworks to derive meaning. It is about noticing 
something in an on-going flow of events, a transient, or something out of the ordinary, 
something surprising. That “something” which is noticed (a cue), is noticed when a person 
looks back in time. It is retrospective in that plausible explanations are sought in past 
experiences to explain the noticed cues.200 Weick states that sensemaking “is about such 
things as placement of items into frameworks, comprehending, redressing surprise, 
constructing meaning, interacting in pursuit of mutual understanding, and patterning.”201 
Weick refines this description by contrasting sensemaking with interpretation to show what 
sensemaking is not. He refers to interpretation as “a rendering in which one word in 
explained by another,” a “focus on some kind of text,” and it “points towards a text to be 
interpreted” and an “audience presumed to be in need of the interpretation.”202 For Weick, 
sensemaking is not only about the reading of the text but also about the authoring of it.  He 
sees authoring and interpretation intertwined in the sensemaking process. Action and 
“creating” lay down the material that needs to be interpreted and reinterpreted.203 Weick 
states that to engage in sensemaking is to “construct, filter, frame, create facticity, and render 
the subjective into something more tangible.”204 In making sense of an event, it is implied 
that “something” must have existed to be noticed. It is only after this “something” was 
noticed that sense is then constructed to render that which is noticed into something sensible.  
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Building on this differentiation of Weick between interpretation and sensemaking, Kinghorn 
states that there is a fundamental difference between meaning and sense. Sense is not inherent 
in meaning but rather the fusing together of a set of meanings and that meaning is derived 
from interpreting what our senses notice around us.205 Sense for Kinghorn, is a “holistic 
construction of our own making as we weld different meanings into a coherent understanding 
of their purpose and base our actions upon this understanding.”206 
3.3 Weick’s seven properties of sensemaking 
Sensemaking as described by Weick should be understood as a process characterised by the 
following seven properties: 
3.3.1 Grounded in identity construction 
Identity construction is one of the core elements of sensemaking. Weick states, “the 
sensemaker is an on-going puzzle undergoing continual redefinition.”207 The sensemaker’s 
sense of who he or she is will affect how that person defines a situation, but the situation will 
also affect the person’s definition of self. Weick cites Knorr-Cetina208 to assert that identities 
are established out of a process of construction – “a typified discursive construction.” Weick 
provides the phrase: “how can I know what I think until I see what I say?”, emphasizing the 
importance of the sense of self in assigning meaning to a situation. Identity has to be 
established as well as maintained for a consistent and positive conception of self.209 Browne 
confirms that this failure to maintain and confirm a sense of self triggers episodes of 
sensemaking.210 
Accordingly, the sense maker has to decide what implications an event will have on the sense 
of self and that the meaning of an event or situation will be determined by the identity 
adopted in handling the situation. The re-affirmation of self-concept reduces the discomfort 
an individual feels when confronted by a situation that is out of the ordinary or inconsistent 
with the norm.211 In other words, our identity shapes how we interpret a situation and what 
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actions we will take in that situation. Weick’s re-interpretation of the Mann Gulch Disaster 
provides a good example of the role of identity in making sense in crises situations. The 
supervisor of a smokejumper team commanded his team members to drop their tools, and lit 
an escape fire in the face of an oncoming and out of control forest fire. Of the fifteen team 
members, only two survived. Dodge, the team supervisor, survived the firestorm by lying 
down in the ashes of his escape fire. Apart from problems such as structure, the order to 
throw away their tools, and the lighting of a fire in the face of the oncoming firestorm, had a 
profound effect on the identity of the smokejumpers as fire fighters, and ultimately on their 
survival. As Weick states, “If I am no longer a fire fighter then who am I?”212 
3.3.2 Retrospective  
The retrospective nature of sensemaking is one of its most distinguishing features for 
Weick.213 He derives retrospective sensemaking from Schutz’s214 analysis of “meaningful 
lived experience.” The emphasis here being on the verb “lived.”  Individuals only know what 
they have done after they have done it. Reflection focuses on lived experience, which 
according to Schutz,215 as cited in Weick,216 is singular and implies distinct separate episodes 
within a “stream of experience.” In order to direct attention to this experience of ours implies 
that it must exist and has already previously passed in the “stream of experience.”217 
Consequently, Weick218 argues that creation of meaning is an attentional process to what has 
already occurred in the past and is directed backward from a specific point in time. However, 
meaning is not attached to the highlighted experience, but rather the kind of attention directed 
to it. Sensemaking is an evaluation of historic or past experience in order to comprehend 
elements of a current situation.219 The following statement of Weick drives the importance of 
retrospect home220:  
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The Dominance of retrospect in sensemaking is a major reason why students of 
sensemaking find forecasting, contingency planning, strategic planning, and other 
magical probes into the future wasteful and misleading if they are decoupled from 
reflective action and history. 
3.3.3  Enactive of sensible environments 
Action is a crucial element of sensemaking for Weick. He draws on the work of Follett221 
whose main notion is the idea that individuals “receive stimuli as a result of their own 
activity.”222 Weick prefers the word enactment and states that people create a portion of the 
environment they deal with. This enactment is circular in the sense that individuals construct 
their own environment as the environment creates them – “people create and find what they 
expect to find.”223 To Weick sensemaking embodies a process that “creates objects for 
sensing or the structures of structuration.”224  
3.3.4  Social 
Sensemaking is essentially a social process. The conduct of individuals is reliant on the 
conduct of imagined or present conduct of others.225 Weick places emphasis on concepts such 
as “network,” “intersubjectively shared meanings,” “common language,” and “social 
interaction,” to drive home the importance of the social nature of sensemaking. Sensemaking 
is thus never separated from others because what we think and do is dependent on others and 
this social contact is mediated through discourse and conversation.226 
3.3.5  Ongoing 
Sensemaking is a continuous process and may be seen as a constant flow with no beginning 
or end. Sensemaking never starts because it never stops. People select moments out of this 
continuous flow and extract cues based on past experience. It is only when this flow is 
interrupted that people become aware of it, which in turn causes an arousal or “discharge of 
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the autonomic nervous system.”227 According to Weick it is this arousal that triggers an act of 
sensemaking alerting an individual that there is something in need of attention.  
3.3.6  Focused on and by extracted cues 
 Weick defines cues as “simple, familiar structures that are seeds from which people develop 
a larger sense of what is taking place.”228 The metaphor of a ‘seed’ is used to highlight the 
open-ended quality of sensemaking when extracted cues are used. Context is an important 
dependency on what extracted cues will ultimately become: it affects what is extracted as a 
cue and how the cue is interpreted. Cues become noteworthy because of context and play an 
important role in taking action or launching into a course of action.229 
3.3.7  Driven by plausibility rather than accuracy 
Sensemaking does not rely on accuracy, but rather plausibility, pragmatism and 
reasonableness. Weick argues that it is about the embellishment and elaboration of cues and 
that “accuracy is meaningless when used to describe a filtered sense of present, linked with a 
reconstruction of the past that has been edited in hindsight.”230 It is not so much about the 
truth, but rather the continuous redrafting of a story so that it becomes more sensible over 
time.231 Accuracy is not as important as sufficiency and plausibility in the enhancement and 
elaboration of extracted cues in the sensemaking process. 
Apart from Weick’s seven properties, there are supplementary features or properties that have 
a bearing on the sensemaking process but do not fall within the scope of this thesis. These 
supplementary issues are categorised into two areas namely, multi-ontological frameworks232 
and power relationships233 in organisations. 
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framework that recognises ordered, complex and chaotic ontologies and posits that they require different 
epistemological approaches – in essence a pluralist epistemology (Aaltonen, M. 2007. The Third Lens p. 
xxiii). There are similarities between Aaltonen’s framework and the Cynefin framework developed by Dave 
Snowden (Kurtz, CF & Snowden, DJ 2003. The New Dynamics of Strategy p.470) in relation to how 
sensemaking works within ordered, complicated and complex environments. Aaltonen goes further to say 
that Brenda Dervin’s work rather than Weick has fostered his approach, in particular that: (1) Sensemaking 
assumes that both humans and reality can be both orderly and chaotic, (2) humans have a need to create 
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In summary, these seven properties or “guiding principles” provide us with a foundation or 
rough guideline to explore sensemaking. However, sensemaking is applicable to both 
individual and organisational levels. Consequently, it is necessary to discuss sensemaking 
within an individual and a group perspective in organisations. 
3.4  Sensemaking: individual and organisational level 
Apart from sensemaking on the level of the individual, Weick recognizes three distinct levels 
of sensemaking from an organisation’s perspective: intersubjective, generic subjective and 
extrasubjective.234 Intersubjective sensemaking emerges as a consequence of interaction 
between individuals, when meaning is derived and synthesised during discussions that 
transform the “I” into the “we.” Generic subjectivity operates at the level of social structure. 
Individuals are no longer present, rather a “generic self” that fulfils roles and follows rules. 
Weick illustrates this by reference to times of stability where generic subjectivity takes on the 
form of scripts, interlocking routines and habituated action patterns where people can 
substitute for one another. In times of uncertainty these scripts and generic subjectivity no 
longer work. Focus has to shift to intersubjectivity in order for individuals to interact and 
synthesise new meaning. The old scripts do not completely disappear during management of 
uncertainty but rather a mixing of the intersubjective and generic subjective.235 To paraphrase 
Weick:  
                                                                                                                                                        
meaning, and (3) there are differences in experience and observation (Aaltonen, M 2007. The Third Lens  
pp.xviii – xix). The latter three points are areas that Weick covers in some detail in Sensemaking in 
Organizations, in specific the occasions (Weick, KE 1995, pp.85-105) and substance of sensemaking 
(Weick, KE 1995, pp. 106-132). Furthermore, Weick is acutely aware that the seven characteristics serve 
merely as a rough guideline for inquiry into sensemaking; he views it more as “a set of raw materials for 
disciplined imagination” than a “tacit set of propositions to be refined and tested.” 
233 Mills Et al. argue for a critical sensemaking approach and that any analysis of sensemaking needs to take 
into account “the contextual factors of structure and discourse” (Mills, JH Thurlow, A Mills, AJ. 2010. 
Making sense of sensemaking pp.188-191). Drawing from interpretism, post-structuralism and critical theory 
they set out to show that sensemaking also takes place within a broader context of organizational power and 
social experience. That some individuals who hold more power in an organization may exert more influence 
on how meaning is derived. Powerful individuals may also exert more power on the sensemaking of others 
in the organization. However, Weick does not discount the role of power relationships and structures in the 
process of sensemaking and is cognizant of the influence that power carries in the construction of social 
reality (Weick, KE Sutcliff, KM and Obstfeld, D 2005. Organizing and the process of sensemaking p.418). 
234 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (70) 
235 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (71,80) 
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What varies during times of convergence and stability and times of divergence and 
turbulence is the relative emphasis on the generic subjectivity and scripts that ratify 
and intersubjectivity and scripts that modify.236 
More importantly when people substitute for one another, (intersubjective to generic 
subjective) there is “always some loss of joint understanding” and a tension between 
innovation (intersubjective) and control (generic subjective). Excessive control frustrates 
innovation and when dominant in an organisation, prevents the reframing of generic 
subjectivity in the face of uncertainty. Lastly, on the extrasubjective level, the generic self is 
replaced by pure meaning “without a knowing subject” such as mathematics, algebra, 
feminism, and capitalism - an “abstract idealized framework derived from prior 
interaction.”237 The circularity of the framing processes at various levels of sensemaking is 
illustrated in figure 11 on page 54. 
The seven attributes of sensemaking operate at both an individual and organisational level 
and organisational forms are the bridging operations between the intersubjective and generic 
subjective levels.238 Furthermore, separating individual sensemaking from organisational 
sensemaking may be an artificial undertaking given the social nature of sensemaking in 
particular. 
 
                                                 
236 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (72) 
237 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (72) 
238 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (73) 
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Figure 11 - Levels of Sensemaking239 
In a similar vein, the property of “extracting cues” and the emphasis on “plausible” 
explanations necessitates a discussion as to what enables warning analysts to notice and 
elaborate on cues or signs present in an environment.  
3.5 Frames within the sensemaking process 
In warning and intelligence analysis the statement in normally made that the “dots” need to 
be connected. The cartoon (figure 12) on page 55 pithily illustrates the problematic nature of 
this conception of “connecting the dots.” 
                                                 
239 Self-constructed, based on Weick, KE. 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations 
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Figure 12 - “Connecting the dots” cartoon240  
These “dots” generally refer to signals identified within a warning or intelligence collection 
system. Hollywood Et al.241 relates this to a problem solver observing a stream of data about 
an environment and scanning this stream of data for “out-of-the-ordinary or atypical signals 
that significantly deviate from the expected status quo.” However, these “dots” can only be 
“connected” by the problem solver if they have been noticed in the first place.  
Starbuck and Milliken refer to noticing as an act of classifying and filtering stimuli as signals 
or noise that results from interactions of the characteristics of stimuli with that of the 
perceiver of the stimuli.242 They note that noticing is a basic form of sensemaking in that 
“noticing requires distinguishing signal from noise, making crude separations of relevant 
from irrelevant.” Weick centres on Starbuck and Milliken’s distinction between sensemaking 
and noticing in his elaboration of the focus of extracting cues as a property of 
sensemaking.243 In particular, Weick emphasizes the idea that noticing determines whether 
                                                 
240 Source: John Trever, 2002, Albuquerque Journal 
241 Hollywood Et al. 2004. Out of the Ordinary – Finding hidden threats by analysing unusual behaviour (xvi) 
242 Starbuck, WH & Milliken, FJ 1988. Executive Perceptual Filters 
243 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (49-55) 
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people even consider responding to environmental events. If events are not noticed, they are 
not available for sensemaking.244 
Starbuck and Milliken245 quote a poem from RD Laing as cited in Goleman’s246 work relating 
to the psychology of self-deception to describe the essence of what “noticing” entails:  
Noticing: Where to look and what to see 
The range of what we think and do 
is limited by what we fail to notice. 
And because we fail to notice 
that we fail to notice 
there is little we can do 
to change 
until we notice 
how failing to notice 
shapes our thoughts and deeds. 
What we notice is affected by context, which is an important dependency in terms of what an 
extracted cue will ultimately develop into. It affects both what is extracted as cues during 
searching, scanning and noticing and how these extracted cues are interpreted.247 According 
to Weick the saliency or noticeability of cues are dependent on their indexicality, which 
refers to the contextual nature of objects and events. Without this indexicality, objects and 
events have equivocal or multiple meanings for people trying to make sense of a situation.248 
In specific, Weick makes reference to what individuals “draw on” to “construct the roles and 
interpret objects” and for him it is this “drawing on something” that suggests “the implicit or 
explicit operation of some sort of frame within which cues are noticed, extracted, and made 
sensible.”249 
                                                 
244 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (52) 
245 Starbuck, WH & Milliken, FJ 1988. Executive Perceptual Filters 
246 Goleman, D 1985. Vital Lies, Simple Truths: The Psychology of Self-Deception. New York: Simon and 
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The concept of frames and framing has received attention across a wide range of disciplines 
such as framing processes and social movements in sociology,250 cognitive psychology,251 
environmental sciences,252 and human decision-making.253 Goffman254 in his seminal work 
Framing Analysis refers to frameworks as “schemata of interpretation.” Goffman argues that 
a frame or framework “[may be seen] as rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless 
aspect of a scene into something that is meaningful.” He refers to the concept that he terms 
“strip,” which is an “arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity.” This strip is 
as Goffman explains, a “raw batch of occurrences that one wants to draw attention to as a 
starting point of analysis.”255 Frames in his view are basic identified elements that are 
responsible for “building of definitions of a situation.” There is a general congruency 
between Weick’s concept of “cues” within frames and Goffman’s “strips,” in that they need 
to be extracted from an “ongoing” stream of experience/occurrences. 
Benford and Snow256 drawing on Goffman define a frame as a “schemata of interpretation” 
that assist people to locate, perceive, label, and identify events or incidents within their 
environment in order to render them meaningful, organise experience and guide action. They 
focus on collective action frames in social movements in which the core framing tasks are 
characterised as action orientated with interactive and discursive processes. Collective action 
frames are constructed as members of a social movement “negotiate a shared understanding 
of some problematic condition.” Three core framing tasks present in the construction of 
meaning are: (1) diagnostic framing which relates to problem identification, (2) prognostic 
framing which relates to the articulation of a proposed solution and (3) motivational framing 
which provides the motivation for individuals in a specific movement to engage in collective 
action to achieve some stated goal.257 The crux from a motivational framing perspective is the 
“construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive” and according to Snow and Benford 
highlights the agency component of collective action frames. 
                                                 
250 Benford, RD & Snow, DA 2000. Framing Processes and Social Movements (611–639) 
251 Fagley, NS Coleman, JG & Simon, AF 2010. Effects of framing, perspective taking, and perspective (264-
269) 
252 Buijs, AE Et al. 2011.  Beyond environmental frames (329-341) 
253 Tversky, A & Kahneman, D 1981. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice  (453–458) 
254 Goffman, E 1974. Frame Analysis (21) 
255 Goffman, E 1974. Frame Analysis (10-11) 
256 Benford, RD & Snow, DA 2000. Framing processes and social movements (614) 
257 Benford, RD & Snow, DA 2000. Framing processes and social movements (615-617) 
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Hallahan258 states that the act of framing is an essential activity in the construction of social 
reality through a process of inclusion, exclusion, and emphasis. He makes use of a window or 
portrait frame metaphor to describe framing in the sense that it is “drawn around 
information,” delimiting the subject matter and focusing attention on the salient points. 
Hallahan259 posits that framing biases the information processing of a person via two 
suggested mechanisms. The first is the provisioning of contextual cues that guide decision-
making and the drawing of inferences. The second is that of priming, which refers to 
“selective influencing” or activation of memory structures or schemata that facilitate the 
interpretation of an event or information received. In essence, this schematic processing as 
Hallahan states, refers to the “associations” and “expectations” that people use when drawing 
conclusions about a situation or information received. 
Similarly Buijs Et al. state that frames are constituted of a connected range of categories and 
labels that are used to interpret issues. Through a process of framing, these categories and 
labels, are applied so that certain aspects or traits of an issue are placed in the foreground and 
others in the background and then related to personal experiences. They define the process of 
framing as “the communicative process through which actors propagate specific lenses and 
try to influence the interpretation of an issue by assigning specific meanings to that issue.” 260 
Shmueli distinguishes between two research streams related to frames, researchers who see 
frames as cognitive devices and those who see frames as communicative devices.  Cognitive 
devices are defined as “interpretive lenses through which we see and make sense of complex 
situations in ways internally consistent with our world views, giving meaning to events in the 
context of life experience, understandings and roles.” Frames as cognitive devices function as 
tools to reduce complexity by filtering, simplifying and categorising information in effect 
reducing information load and “operate as models of reality that trade detail for clarity.”261 In 
particular, frames are linked by Shmueli to information processing, message patterns, 
linguistic cues and socially constructed meaning. As a communicative device, frames operate 
in a strategic process intending to persuade “others to one’s own viewpoint, to gain advantage 
in negotiations, or to rally like-minded people to the cause.” 
                                                 
258 Hallahan, K 1999. Seven models of framing (207) 
259 Hallahan, K 1999. Seven models of framing (208-209) 
260 Buijs, AE Et al. 2011. Beyond environmental frames (330) 
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There are various communalities between Weick’s theory of sensemaking and the research 
efforts of authors such as Shmueli262 and Buijs Et al.263 within the frames and framing 
disciplines. Shmueli, for one, clearly acknowledges that the concept of framing has evolved 
“at the intersection of several disciplines,” such as decision-making, artificial intelligence, 
negotiations, business management and, environmental conflict management. 
As showed previously on page 51 a core property of sensemaking is its focus on extracted 
cues and Weick places specific emphasis on context or indexicality provided by frames. The 
next section will unpack Weick’s concept of “minimal sensible structures” which refers to the 
content of frames. 
3.6 Frames and framing according to Weick  
Weick differentiates between cues and frames by comparing them as vocabularies. Abstract 
words are equated with frames that include and point to cues, which are equated to less 
abstract words. These less abstract words or cues become sensible in the context created by 
the abstract and more inclusive words. As Weick explicitly states: “a cue in a frame is what 
makes sense, not a cue or a frame alone,” for him the substance of sensemaking starts with 
three elements or units of meaning: a frame, a cue and a connection.264 Weick sees frames as 
“past moments of socialization” and cues as “present moments of experience.” Weick draws 
on Gary Klein’s265 work relating to recognition-primed decision making to lay emphasis on 
“past moments” connected to current moments of experience. The “substance” of 
sensemaking can be found in “the frames and categories that summarise past experience, in 
the cues and labels that snare specifics of present experience, and in the ways these two 
settings of experience are connected.”266 
3.6.1 Minimal sensible structures 
Weick contends that the content of sensemaking is embodied in frames and these frames 
consist of six minimal sensible structures that describe these past moments of experience, 
present moments and connections:267 
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 3.6.1.1 Ideology (vocabularies of society) 
Ideology is a reasonably unified set of emotive beliefs, values and norms that share and bind 
individuals together so that they can make sense of their environment. Individuals tend to 
simplify what they perceive and ideology provides the structure to enable the simplification. 
Ideology thus acts as a filter through which cues are extracted or selected within an on-going 
stream of experience. The content of ideologies originate in what Weick268 refers to as 
“extraorganizational sources” such as national cultures, regional and community cultures, 
industry ideologies, and occupational ideologies and these content sources are not in short 
supply. However, Weick warns that researchers need to be cautious in that individuals select 
from a vast pool of ideological substance only a “small portion that matters.” It should never 
be assumed that ideologies are singular or homogenous and different meanings are perceived 
from ideological content. This meaning perceived from ideological content is also 
imperfectly communicated during the socialisation and re-socialisation process. 
3.6.1.2 Third-order controls (vocabularies of organisation)  
Third-Order Controls or premise controls are one of three forms of control that operate in 
organisations. Direct supervision is the first order, followed by programs and routines as 
second and third, premise controls, which comprise assumptions and definitions that are 
taken as given.269 Premise controls, specifically, influence the suppositions individuals use 
when they evaluate or diagnose a situation in order to make a decision. Weick highlights the 
unobtrusive nature of premise controls in that they influence sensemaking in an “implicit, 
tacit, preconscious, mindless and taken for granted manner.”270 Premise controls are more 
pervasive when organisational technology is non-routine and it joins sensemaking with 
decision making. What makes premise controls powerful is that its early influence in 
decision-making is capable of affecting subsequent steps in the decision process. They 
include factual and value content and, because the probity of these premises are unknown, 
selection is made on other grounds such as ideology. When premise controls are in operation 
the content that is used to make sense of an organisational conundrum may have a common 
understood meaning.271  
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Consequently the non-routine nature of work at higher or top levels of organisational 
hierarchies creates a situation where premise controls are more likely to be in operation.272 
Organisational designers tend to control lower levels of organisational hierarchies with first -
and second-order controls working up towards management in higher hierarchical levels. 
Controlled work in lower organisational hierarchies creates non-routine derivatives or 
offshoots in higher organisational hierarchies that need explanation. Invariably technology is 
used to impose first and second order controls at the different levels of organisational 
hierarchies – and this is problematic from a sensemaking viewpoint. As Weick states273:  
People at the top often inadvertently make their task more difficult by 
their efforts to make it easier. When they impose first- or second-order 
controls on subordinates, they create interactively complex situations 
that enlarge in unexpected directions, with unintended consequences, 
in ways that defy comprehension. When top management creates 
incomprehension, the major sensemaking resource they have left to 
handle the resulting mess is third-order premises. 
3.6.1.3 Paradigms (vocabularies of work)  
Paradigms refer to inherent assumptions about what sort of “things make up the world” and 
how they interrelate.274 They differ from ideology and third order controls in the sense that 
paradigms tend to be self-contained systems capable of serving different realities. In specific 
Weick defines paradigms “as sets of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations that show how 
theories of action are applied conceptually, observationally, and instrumentally to 
representative organizational problems.”275 Paradigms capture conflict and the inductive 
origins of sensemaking as qualities from within an organisational perspective.276 Conflict 
relates to the degree of consensus about a paradigm. Importantly this agreement on a 
paradigm is related to its existence rather than the paradigms rules or rationalized form.277 
Weick argues that paradigms are similar to culture and that examples associated with 
paradigms “become the artefacts that symbolize the culture and aid its transmission.” It is 
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these “artefacts” that are interpreted differently, which enables the re-accomplishment of the 
paradigm in different ways. These differences may result in conflict or trigger new 
interpretations more suited to changes in the environment. Examples of paradigms take on the 
form of stories from which the on-going meaning of events is induced.278 
3.6.1.4 Theories of action (vocabularies of coping)  
Theories of Action are distinctive frames that filter and interpret signals from the 
environment and connect stimuli to response.279 Theories of action are distinct for Weick as 
they build on the stimulus-response (S-R) paradigm. Individuals in organisations construct 
knowledge in trial-and-error sequences in response to the circumstances they encounter in 
their environment. These trial-and-error response sequences include processes of cautious 
organisational adjustment to reality, and the aggressive use of knowledge to enhance the 
organisational environmental fit. In essence, an organisation needs to map its environment 
and determine causal relationships operating in the environment so that it may identify 
stimuli properly and select the most appropriate responses. Weick defines theories of action 
as abstractions that simplify in the interest of action and that their content is “derived from 
socialization experiences that reflect ideology in the organization.”280 As Weick concludes, 
“maps, knowledge structures, and mental models all contain substance that provides a 
meaningful frame that facilitates meaningful noticing.”281  
3.6.1.5 Tradition (vocabularies of predecessors)  
Tradition according to Weick is something that was created, performed, believed or existed in 
the past and has been handed down through generations with the qualification that it must 
have been passed on over three generations.282 Importantly only images, objects, and beliefs 
can be transmitted as tradition, not action, but only patterns or images of action. Concrete 
human action and know-how embodied in practice can only endure or be transmitted if it 
becomes symbolic.283 The symbolisation of traditions requires a complex transformation of 
action and know-how into symbols that may be transmitted. During this symbolisation the 
                                                 
278 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (118) 
279 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (121) 
280 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (123) 
281 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (121) 
282 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations(124) 
283 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (125) 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 63 
“contents of the images used to portray action are crucial because they determine what will 
be perpetuated.” Their symbolic encoding enables their “handing down” across 
generations.284  
3.6.1.6 Stories (vocabularies of sequence and experience)  
Stories are important for sensemaking given individuals’ predisposition to inductive 
generalisation. In this regard, striking or notable experiences become the empirical basis for 
“rules of thumb, proverbs and other guides to conduct.”285 These “guides to conduct” that the 
stories provide underline the notion that frames guide behaviour by facilitating the 
interpretation of cues which that conduct emphasises. Weick in particular draws on the work 
of Mitroff and Kilmann,286 Polkinghorne287 and Zukier288 to accentuate the role that stories 
play in sensemaking as well as highlighting the idea that individuals think narratively as 
opposed to argumentatively or paradigmatically.289 When individuals translate their lives into 
narrative form the stories that result from this translation do not duplicate the experience. 
Rather this experience is filtered and events in the story are given an order in the form of a 
sequence.290 According to Weick sequencing is a powerful heuristic for sensemaking and 
because the “essence of storytelling is sequencing”, stories provide powerful content for 
sensemaking. Ideologies, paradigms and traditions are recognised by their examples rather 
than their abstract framing principles. In this regard, stories are cues within frames and are 
also capable of creating frames.291 
Weick thus conceptualises the six minimal sensible structures as the content embodied in 
frames.  Consequently, it is necessary to investigate how these minimal sensible structures 
are imposed on an on-going flow of experience so that cues may then be extracted and 
connected to these frames. Weick proposes four ways in which people impose frames on an 
on-going flow of experience in pursuit of making sense of a situation. Sensemaking can start 
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with beliefs in the form of arguing and expecting or it may begin with actions in the form of 
committing or manipulating.292  
Sensemaking represents an endeavour  to link beliefs and actions in closer proximity because: 
(1) arguments facilitate agreement on action, (2) expectations that are made clear map the 
way for confirmed actions, (3) committed actions expose suitable justifications for their 
occurrence, and (4) bold actions make the world straightforward and clarifies what is 
happening.  Therefore, the fundamental operations of sensemaking for Weick entail “taking 
whatever is clearer belief or action and linking it with that which is less clear.”293 
3.6.2 Belief-driven sensemaking: arguing and expecting  
Weick emphasises the centrality of arguing in organisational sensemaking. In particular, 
Weick294 cites the work of Schmidt,295 which refers to organisational sensemaking as 
“debative cooperation.” In this regard, one has to evaluate both the individual and social 
meaning of the word argument. Looking at it from an individual perspective, it relates to a 
piece of reasoned discourse and socially as a dispute between two or more parties. However, 
there is a connection between individually reasoned discourse and a dispute between parties. 
Weick sees social argument as “debate that expresses the contradiction implicit in any 
position that is articulated” and it is within this social argument that individual reasoning is 
embedded.296 An argument may lead to adaptive sensemaking because the reasoning process 
present during the development and criticism of explanations help people discover new 
explanations.297 Sensemaking occurs when the tension that underlies arguing gradually 
effects an elaboration and strengthening of initial or weak explanations as their advocates 
confront critics.298 
Expectations on the other hand are more directive than arguments as they tend to filter more 
emphatically299 The urge for confirmation of an expectation is more potent than the urge for 
rebuttal or contradiction of an argument. Weick states that this urge “resemble[s] the singular, 
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strongly felt unqualified beliefs of action rationality rather than the reasoned qualified beliefs 
of decision rationality.”300 Connecting a cue to an expectancy establishes a unit of meaning 
and the expectancy is used to test for and expand additional implications of the cues, which 
are then tested against new cues.301 Weick draws from the work of Klein in arguing that 
where situations satisfice people’s expectations (accurate enough), confidence is gained in 
situational assessments. Perception assimilates what is seen to what is expected and in this 
respect may be a source of inaccuracy during the sensemaking process. Expectations may, 
however, be self-correcting for when events and expectations diverge both may be adjusted. 
It is this “self-adjustment” that is an important construct in the study of self-fulfilling 
prophecies.302 
Weick provides a critique of the work of Merton regarding self-fulfilling prophecies in his 
discussion of expectations as a belief-driven process of sensemaking. In essence, Merton as 
cited by Weick, states that a self-fulfilling prophecy starts out as a false definition of a given 
situation. This false definition then results in behaviour that makes it come true. Expectations 
are in a sense pliable as they are likely to change progressively if it seems that they are at risk 
of not being fulfilled. Weick sees self-fulfilling prophecies as a fundamental act of 
sensemaking. Prophecies, hypotheses and anticipations are the starting points or minimal 
structures around which inputs can be assimilated due to some kind of active prodding.303 
Weick deems expectations to drive this prodding. 
An expectation relating to an event or situation results in noticing becoming focused. It 
affects what information is retained and selected for processing as well as what inferences are 
made. Weick argues that when perceivers act on expectations it is possible that they enact 
what they perceive or expect to be there. In his words “using their predictions as a lens, they 
often confirm their prediction.”304 
3.6.3  Action-driven sensemaking: commitment and manipulation 
In both commitment and manipulation, sensemaking starts with action. If a person is 
responsible for the action, it shows behavioural commitment. Manipulation is responsible for 
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situations where action has made a visible change in the world that is in need of explanation. 
The commitment process is focused on a single action whilst manipulation is focused on 
multiple simultaneous actions. Commitment places “a greater premium on explanation and 
cognition as a means by which sense is created” while manipulation emphasises the actual 
change in an environment.305 Deliberation and social information processing play a larger 
role in commitment and are harder to produce than manipulation, as a specific situation that 
tends to occur infrequently is required. Weick states that manipulation is more robust and 
bold and “is about cunning.”306 Once individuals make a choice regarding the justification of 
actions that they may perform, they establish the frame through which their actions and 
beliefs will make sense in.307 
Individuals will try to construct meaning around actions to which they have a very strong 
commitment and according to Weick, this focuses sensemaking on binding actions.308 If one 
wants to understand sensemaking, the earlier binding actions of individuals (a committed act 
in search of explanation) and the justifications available need to be investigated as a starting 
point. Weick states that this binding behaviour must be explicit, public and irrevocable and a 
combination of these constructs the reality that the action occurred.309 Commitment focuses 
attention, exposes unnoticed elements and “imposes a form of logic on the interpretation of 
action.”310 
Manipulation focuses on the meaningful consequences of the action itself and involves acting 
in a way that establishes an environment that people can understand. It generates clarity in a 
confusing environment. Whilst commitment focuses on the question, “Why did the action 
occur?” Manipulation centres on the question, “What did occur?” As Weick states, 
manipulation “[is] the meaningful consequences of action [and] generates clearer outcomes in 
a puzzling world.” It may be operationalised in the statement “leap before you look.” 311 
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Figure 13 below illustrates how minimal sensible structures, or the content of frames as 
imposed on an on-going stream of experience, by argument, expectation, commitment or 
manipulation, fit into that larger process of sensemaking as proposed by Weick. 
 
Figure 13 - Sensemaking Diagram312  
3.7  Implications 
Sensemaking as a process has seven fundamental characteristics. It is grounded in identity 
construction, retrospective, enactive of sensible environments, social in nature, ongoing, 
focused on an by extracted cues and driven by plausibility rather than accuracy. The essence 
of  sensemaking, in Weickian terms, is the connecting of a cue with a frame which establishes 
a unit of meaning. Framing is a critical component of this process as without it no unit of 
meaning is established. Framing enables individuals to notice cues or “strips” within an on-
going flow of experience. Individuals construct or craft sense after this noticing of strips and 
cues. Creation of meaning is linked to what has already occurred in the past, it is 
retrospective in that plausible explanations are sought in the past.  
                                                 
312 Self-constructed – based on Weick, KE, 1995 
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The content of frames are represented by what Weick refers to as minimal sensible structures 
and are imposed on an ongoing stream of experience through beliefs and actions. The key to 
sensemaking is the saliency or noticeability of cues that relates to their indexicality, which 
refers to the contextual nature as represented by the content of frames. Noticing determines 
whether people even consider responding to environmental events. If events are not noticed, 
they are not available for sensemaking. Cues are only noticed if priming, activation of 
memory or minimal sensible structures occur. 
The retrospective nature of sensemaking has a profound effect for the concepts detailed 
earlier in this thesis – in that accuracy can only be determined in hindsight. Furthermore, to 
direct attention to a cue and make sense of it implies that it must have existed in the first 
place to be noticed. Plausible, and not necessarily accurate explanations, are sought in past 
experience to explain noticed cues. Plausibility is important due to the open-ended quality of 
sensemaking, as cues are seen as “seeds” that are elaborated and embellished during the 
process. 
However, this meaning is attached to the attention directed at the noticed cues and strips. The 
strips and cues can be seen as seeds in need of elaboration. Noticing is thus a critical act in 
making sense. The “dots” need to be noticed before they can be connected. The likelihood of 
noticing cues, signs and signals are dependent on how minimal sensible structures (the 
content embodied in frames) are imposed on a stream of experience though arguing, 
expecting, manipulation and commitment.  
Organisational sensemaking occurs between the various organisational levels described by 
Weick. It is contingent on bridging operations between the intra-, inter-, generic, and extra- 
subjective levels. These bridging operations are essential reframing operations as the 
organisation shifts between stability and uncertainty as organisational scripts are modified 
and ratified. The critical issue is that sense is crafted through various interactions at various 
levels. As individuals perform warning analysis, and the warning systems are essentially 
situated within organisational structures, an understanding of the bridging operations is 
critical to ensure that sense of warning signs noticed is made on an analyst’s as well as an 
organisational level. 
The importance of expectation, as a way in which frames are imposed on a present situation  
have significant implications and questions for the functioning of early warning systems in a 
number of areas. Creating expectations, or invoking a capacity within the analyst’s mind to 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 69 
generate visions of the future, determines what cues the individuals will notice. This leads to 
the question as to how this is translated into warning analysis? 
The intricacies, nuances and effects of expectation, as a belief-driven form of sensemaking 
within warning systems, need to be understood to apply it to warning systems. Furthermore, 
it needs to be established how framing applies to individual analysts and the warning 
organisation and what the interaction between the two is. 
Finally, given the nature of Weick’s sensemaking, can Visual Analytics, as a software 
solution, support analyst sensemaking and reframing in warning systems or can it only 
support representation constructions (sense-making)? 
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Chapter 4 
Applying Weick’s sensemaking 
theory to weak signals, early 
warning and Visual Analytics 
 “Our expertise is as much about recognizing legitimate dots as about connecting them”         
– Gary Klein313 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter Four represents an application and synthesis of Weick’s theory of sensemaking,  
specifically framing, with the concepts discussed in Chapter Two of the thesis: weak signals, 
early warning systems and Visual Analytics software. In the first instance, Weick’s theory of 
sensemaking is used as a framework to clarify the concept of weak signals and the role 
framing has on the noticing of cues. Secondly, the addition of the frames theory of 
sensemaking to early warning systems is discussed. This includes the initial stages of the 
early warning analysis process and the importance of “expectation” as a belief driven form of 
sensemaking within warning analysis. It is followed by a discussion of bridging levels in 
warning systems, culminating in the introduction of the Warning Event Bridging (WEB) 
sequence. The WEB sequence represents the levels that warning signals or cues needs to 
bridge in order to become effective. Thirdly, it deliberates the contribution that Weick and 
framing can make to improving Visual Analytics and whether it can support analyst 
sensemaking. 
4.2 Weak signals: a Weickian perspective 
As has been shown in Chapter Two, there are various interpretations in terms of what 
constitutes a weak signal and the terms used to define it include: 
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1) Vague and imprecise signals or harbingers of possible future change314 
2) Imprecise or early indications about impending events315 
3) The first symptoms of strategic discontinuities or possible change in the future316 
4) An idea or trend that will affect business317 
5) Individual events or group of interrelated events - events may not seem important or 
far-reaching at first but may have far-reaching consequences for the future318 
6) A sign of a future wild card - signpost wild cards or gradual future change319 
7) The large impact of effect, positive or negative, that the phenomena must represent if 
the initial signal is to qualify as a weak signal320 
8) Information about the likelihood of an event with a low probability estimate and high 
impact uncertainty321 
9) Candidate weak signals, hypotheses or starting points for exploratory reflection.322 
These variations centre around what exactly represents a weak signal in terms of its initial 
manifestation as well as its final impact. However, the imprecise, nebulous or vague state of 
the signal or sign when first noticed is a common aspect of weak signals within the Ansoffian 
and neo-Ansoffian tradition. There is a progressive nature or graduated response to the signal 
in converting it into a format which is more sensible. The focus of these two traditions is on 
identifying or recognising the signals or signs of impending change or discontinuity. 
The link to Weick’s theory of sensemaking and the use of it as a framework to evaluate weak 
signals is provided by a simple question. How and why are signals identified in the first 
place? This question relates back to a key construct of Weick: a cue, frame and a connection 
creates a unit of meaning – not a cue or a frame by itself. Any discussion of warning signs or 
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weak signals without an acknowledgement of the influence of frames or framing in its 
identification or noticing is ill considered. 
Weick emphasises the notion of extracted cues as one of seven characteristics of 
sensemaking. A cue is an analogue to a sign or signal and according to Weick a 
“representative of the entire datum323 from which it originates.”324 Given the initial vague and 
imprecise nature of a weak signal, Weick also underscores the metaphor of a “seed” to 
emphasise the adjustable or “open-ended” nature of the sensemaking process when extracted 
cues are used. He specifically uses the “seed” metaphor to describe the vagueness and 
uncertainty of outcomes (indeterminacy) associated with the process of sensemaking. Weick 
states that extracted cues are “simple familiar structures that are seeds from which people 
develop a larger sense of what may be occurring.”325 Essentially the cue or “seed” is not an 
exact blueprint for the greater whole or specific tree that it represents. Rather it is, at best, a 
rough outline as to what the greater whole or tree will look like based on specific 
environmental variables i.e. a point of reference. Embellishment and elaboration of an 
extracted cue, out of an on-going stream of experience, occurs when it is linked to a more 
general idea. This parallels the progressive nature of weak signals and the need to amplify the 
“strength” of the signal to illicit the meaning and ultimately its effect. 
Weick is specific in his emphasis on how people first notice, then extract and subsequently 
embellish the cues.326 Context is a dependency in terms of what an extracted cue will become 
in two important ways. It firstly affects what is initially extracted as a cue and secondly how 
it is interpreted. This initial noticing of the cue is the crux of the matter. Weick posits that 
noticing determines whether people will respond to environmental events and cues. This 
noticing refers to activities of filtering, classifying and comparing and is an informal, 
                                                 
323 Weick’s choice of the term “datum” (singular term for data) is germane. At the signal’s genesis point it 
represents what it signifies. As humans try to make sense of it, due to a variety of frames and minimal 
sensible structures, data are generated regarding the various interpretations regarding it meaning – this 
represents the “weakness” of the signal. Datum may also be referred to as the signatum. In this context 
signatum refers to “the object” or “referent”, or “something beyond the sign from which it represents” 
(Chandler 2002:29): In Peircean terms, that “something” that the sign stands for; In Saussurean terms, that 
which the sign (signans or signifier) signifies (signatum) (Chandler 2002:33-35). That which is “signified” 
or the signatum/object is not confined to only the physical, but also the abstract (Chandler 2002:33-35).   
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involuntary beginning to sensemaking while sensemaking represents the interpretation and 
activity of determining what the noticed cue means. 
Weick makes an important distinction between noticing and scanning. Whilst noticing is 
involuntary and informal, scanning is strategic, conscious and deliberate. Noticing is a 
dependency for sensemaking in that events or cues not noticed are not available for 
sensemaking.327 As discussed earlier, environmental scanning as initially proposed by 
Aguilar and incorporated in systems such as Liebl’s Phased Strategic Issue Management 
System, and Strategic Early Warning Systems (SEWS), is seen as a method to identify weak 
signals. However, the act of noticing, and contextual elements (frames) necessary for noticing 
cues, seldom feature in environmental scanning systems. Frames, according to Weick,328 
demarcate the area within which cues are extracted. Therefore frames enable the noticing of 
cues in a scanned environment.  
In Weickian terms, the content of frames or minimal sensible structures, (which is a mixture 
of ideology, third order controls, paradigms, theories of action, tradition and stories) is 
imposed on an on-going stream of experience during either a belief- or action-driven 
sensemaking process. Certain initiating conditions such as turbulence, information load and 
complexity leads to uncertainty and equivocality that also affects what is noticed. The 
presentation of expecting, as a belief-driven form of sensemaking, is evident in various earlier 
discussions around weak signal and early warning analysis, for example: 
- Grabo’s distinction between “indication” and “indicator”, 
- Mendonca’s concept of “imaginability” of surprise, 
- Hiltunen’s attempt to separate the sign from the phenomena that the signs represents 
(similar to Grabo’s “indication” and “indicator”), 
- Recher’s concept of “Mind invoking.” 
These concepts create expectations, which filter input and, as Weick argues, it is this 
connection of a cue or signal  to an expectancy that establishes meaning.329 Importantly, from 
a “weak signal” perspective, an expectancy can be used to test, elaborate and expand on 
already noticed cues, which may then be tested against new cues. Noticing becomes more 
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focused when events are compared with an expectation and has an effect on the information 
that is selected and retained.330 
Weak signal analysis is decidedly future orientated. The present environment is monitored for 
cues and signals that may provide clues or pointers to some environmental state in the open-
ended, unknowable future. The ability to notice is a determining factor in the noticing of 
clues or pointers to some possible future state. An individual’s ability to notice is contingent 
on the content of his or her current frames. This content is made up of minimal sensible 
structures as posited by Weick.331 The content of these frames are imposed on the present 
environment via belief- and action-driven sensemaking. Due to this future orientation of 
weak signal analysis, expectations, as a belief-driven form of sensemaking, are a key driver 
in terms of how an individual imposes his or her frames on the current stream of experience. 
With this in mind and viewed within a singular framing event, a weak signal may thus be 
defined as: 
The initial vague or imprecise cue noticed, and then extracted, out of the present stream of 
experience, signposting some plausible future state, which then acts as a seeding platform for 
embellishment and elaboration in the ongoing sensemaking process, the ultimate effect of 
which can only be determined in retrospect. 
Weak cues or signals are extracted out of the present and combined with a selected frame that 
is situated in the individual’s past cognitions and abridged experience - this is a retrospective 
action. The connection of the cue with a frame establishes a unit of meaning, and this 
established meaning is plausible rather than accurate. This extracted cue then acts as a seed 
for new meanings. Sensemaking is, however, ongoing332, social and based on identity 
construction, which is a dynamic construction of different identities depending on the 
situation. The ongoing nature drives the embellishment and elaboration of the initially 
noticed cue. Embellishment of the extracted cue together with the concept of enactment in 
effect amplify the “strength” of the “signal.” 
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4.3 The addition of frames theory of sensemaking in early warning systems – 
improving cue and signal recognition  
 
Figure 14 - Intelligence Warning Process333 
The key to a successful warning system is the ability to notice weak signals and cues in the 
environment so that appropriate action may be taken. Figure 14 represents a graphic 
representation of Khalsa’s warning process. It is similar to that of Pirolli and Card and 
Bodnar’s models as reported earlier. These models tend to be descriptive of the steps that 
occur in a warning organization as well as steps that analysts follow in processing and 
analysing warning data and information.  The analysis that follows will show how Weick’s 
theory of sensemaking makes an important contribution to the effective operation of an early 
warning system, on both the level of the individual and that of the organisation. Weick’s 
contribution to step one and two, as well as the scanning/monitoring system, are assessed 
first. Secondly, Khalsa’s process has organisational elements, which necessitates an 
assessment of the influence of Weick’s framing on an organisational level in warning 
systems, in specific, bridging operations. Thirdly, software, specifically Visual Analytics, is 
increasingly being used to manage and analyse warning data and information collected by the 
scanning and monitoring structures within an early warning system. This is represented by 
steps three, four and five and the contribution of Weick from a framing perspective, is also 
assessed. 
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4.3.1 Weick’s sensemaking in relation to the first stages of the warning process 
Belief-driven sensemaking plays an important role in early warning systems. The manner in 
which the content of frames is imposed on our present experience, by creating expectations, 
has a profound effect on the functioning of a warning system. These “indications” of 
indicators reflect back to the “weakness” ascribed to a weak signal. An “indication” is not a 
direct representation of an indicator, but rather its wispy, malleable representation. The 
“indication” is then embellished over time as the warning analyst’s frames are updated as 
new information is assimilated into the warning system.  
Expectations drive the development of indicators, which direct the search and scanning for 
“indications” pointing to the presence of indicators. In order to establish a range of  
indicators, to act as possible signposts to the likelihood or potentiality of future scenarios, a 
wide range of possible futures need to be constructed.  
However, plausible futures form the basis of scenario construction.334 Given the complex 
nature of early warning systems and scenario planning, the “exploration-of-the-space-of-
possibilities,” as posited by Milton-Kelly,335 suggests that in unstable and rapidly changing 
environments a flexible approach based on requisite variety is required. This refers to 
Ashby’s law of requisite variety336 to which Weick337 attaches the importance of  highly 
varied “human thought and action” in comprehending “variations in an ongoing flow of 
events.” The richness of a person’s thoughts and language, according to Weick, influences 
sensemaking as it echoes this requisite variety necessary to see variations. Consequently, a 
wider and richer repertoire of plausible scenarios will more likely generate a richer and more 
varied number of indicators to monitor for in early warning systems.  
This provisioning of varied contributions from different stories and sequences at an early 
stage of the warning process also relates to Weick’s concept of mindfulness. This is the 
combination of ongoing scrutiny, refinement and differentiation of existing expectations 
based on newer experiences. The willingness and capability of the warning analysts “to 
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invent new expectations” and a “more nuanced appreciation of context” and importantly 
“new dimensions of context” all contribute to establishing mindfulness.338 
Weick and Sutcliffe339 attribute the success of High Reliability Organizations (HROs) in 
managing the unexpected by their increased capability to “notice the unexpected in the 
making, [and] focus on containing it” – i.e. acting mindfully. This relates to maintaining 
cognitive operations that continuously update, develop and extend reasonable interpretations 
of the reigning contextual situation. In other words constantly reviewing and updating the 
frames through which the current environment is monitored. This is congruent with Rescher’s 
principle of conceptual innovation and “mind-invokingness.” In countering the unexpected, 
expectations play a cardinal role: to expect something is to be prepared for it. 
Weick and Sutcliffe categorise surprise or the unexpected into five main forms340: 
- Bolts out of the blue, incidents with no prior expectation, hint or model of event 
- An issue that is recognized but the direction of the expectation is erroneous 
- Situations where you discover that your timing is off 
- The expected duration of an event proves wrong, and 
- The magnitude of an expected problem is not foreseen. 
Surprise in all these forms start with an expectation and when an expectation is disconfirmed 
it triggers an episode of sensemaking. The dynamics of warning and surprise are enmeshed 
with expectations, autonomic arousal, cues and signals, frames and reframing and the ability 
to bridge between intrasubjective, intersubjective and generic subjective levels of an 
organisation. 
Autonomic arousal that occurs due to surprise or shock has a very specific influence on 
information requirements. Equivocality and uncertainty have very different information 
requirements to facilitate sensemaking. Trying to mitigate equivocality or uncertainty with 
the wrong kind of information will merely exacerbate nonsensical episodes. Equivocal refers 
to the presence of multiple explanations for a problem situation while uncertainty is a state of 
ignorance created by a lack of information.341 Both create occasions for sensemaking where 
elaboration and reframing of frames are necessary. A cue or sign is noticed due to autonomic 
                                                 
338 Weick, KE & Sutcliffe, KM. 2001. Managing the Unexpected (41) 
339 Weick, KE & Sutcliffe, KM 2001. Managing the unexpected (3) 
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arousal caused by the shock of it. However, due to the new situation the memory structure 
selected has to be adapted to fit reality by modifying the details of the structure. 
The ability to recognise equivocality or uncertainty is critical in a warning system because it 
requires very different information strategies. Ignorance or uncertainty is normally due to a 
lack of information and as such more information is required to resolve a situation. 
Equivocality results from multiple meanings. Resolving it requires collaborative interaction 
with colleagues or experts rather than using formal information systems. Weick states: “[that] 
the main reason to separate confusion from ignorance is that communication capabilities that 
help resolve one may hinder the other.”342 Scanning the environment for more information 
during equivocal situations will only compound the situation further. Only debate and 
collaboration with other people will resolve it. 
The aforementioned raises questions regarding Hiltunen’s343 assertion that the “objective” 
two-dimensional axis (signal and issue) of a triadic sign is countable and, in theory, visible to 
everybody. She argues that the amount of information received from the “objective” 
dimension can be improved by systematic environmental scanning. This in turn improves the 
ability, of “open-minded’ and “future-orientated” individuals, to interpret the subjective axis 
(interpretation) of a sign.344 
The visibility and this supposed “countability” of the sign is subject to the individual’s 
capacity to notice. Open mindedness is in the frame of the beholder, so to speak. In addition, 
systematic environmental scanning will only work in situations where uncertainty reigns, 
where equivocality reigns more scanning may increase incomprehensibility of the situation. 
Furthermore, autonomic arousal focuses attention on the interrupting or threatening event 
thus hampering information-processing capabilities. 
4.3.1.1 Autonomic arousal and mindfulness 
The arousal alerts people to the interruption but the focused attention on the interruption 
reduces the capability to recognise more cues. Cue loss further heightens the state of arousal 
leading to less sensemaking. In an “every day” sense the amount of attention that an 
individual will allocate to sensemaking will be regulated by “shocks” that interrupt the flow 
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of events.345 Martinie Et al. support this in their examination of why the performance of a 
person experiencing dissonance is facilitated in simple tasks but is impaired with complex 
tasks. They state that complex tasks involving a high level of cognition and strategic 
knowledge elicitation, engages explicit and conscious processes that require considerable 
working memory capacity. This is necessary for figuring out the multiple operations 
necessary to perform these complex tasks.346 
Early warning environments, especially in anti-terrorism settings, place additional stress on 
analysts in terms of the high stakes involved regarding surprise. Cognitive dissonance347 is 
particularly important when decisions are critical because dissonance created by decisions 
with high stakes in the outcomes can be enormous.348 Furthermore, research shows that 
dissonance not only has psychological but also physiological effects. This includes changes 
in vasoconstriction, heartbeat, alpha waves and galvanic skin responses.349 
This raises questions about whether individuals can function in an environment where they 
continuously have to operate in a peculiar cognitive state of operation such as high 
dissonance. What happens when analysts leave their place of work and have to operate in the 
normal cognitive state once they go home? 
In this regard, Weick and Sutcliff provide a possible solution: they argue that the unpleasant 
experience associated with this autonomic arousal is managed by anticipation or 
expectation.350 Your expectations enlarge the frames through which you view your 
environment. However, a simple set of expectations may result in not noticing serious 
problems. In order to facilitate a continuous cycle of elaborating, questioning, comparing and 
reframing of frames Weick and Sutcliff351 propose the concept of “Mindfulness”. In specific, 
they refer to the “combination of on-going scrutiny of existing expectations, continuous 
refinement and differentiation of expectations based on newer experiences.” Their 
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characteristics of “mindfulness” are: (1) a preoccupation with failure, (2) reluctance to 
simplify interpretations, (3) sensitivity to operations, (4) commitment to resilience, and (5) 
deference to expertise.352 More importantly, as previously discussed in Chapter 3, 
expectations can be self-correcting as joint adjustment of the expectation and the event is 
possible.353 When people act on their expectations they tend to enact what they predict. 
There is also some caution, Weick and Sutcliff354 warn about relying too heavily on 
expectations. They act like “an invisible hand” and if warning analysts depend on a simple set 
of expectations, unexpected events will develop to serious levels before they are noticed as 
problematic. Ongoing scrutiny, continuous refinement and a willingness and capability to 
invent new expectations should become key features of early warning analysis and systems. 
These are analyst specific tasks that need to take place within the structure of “mindfulness.” 
It is a continuous cycle where the minimal sensible structures of analysts as well as that of the 
organisation are continuously updated as the monitored environment changes. 
This drive to develop varied and nuanced expectations (reframing operations), represents the 
foundation of indicator development that in turn provides the target boundaries of scanning 
systems. The intelligence collection plan is, in effect, an act of filtering. It is the product of 
the conscious authoring of expectations by warning analysts within the perspective of 
mindfulness, determining the target environment, reach and categories of scanning. However, 
this scanning is, as Weick posits, strategic, conscious and deliberate, while the reframing 
operations provides the involuntary beginning – the act of noticing, leading to cue extraction 
and its subsequent embellishment. 
4.3.2 Framing operations - bridging levels in warning systems 
Weak signals and warning signs also cannot only be reduced to the individual’s level of 
analysis. Individuals normally operate as part of larger organisations. In order for an 
organisation to take notice and elaborate on extracted cues, weak signals and warning signs, 
they need to be bridged between various levels of the organisation. Framing operations are 
necessary to enable bridging between these levels. 
                                                 
352 Weick, KE & Sutcliffe, KM 2001. Managing the unexpected (10) 
353 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (147) 
354 Weick, KE & Sutcliffe, KM 2001. Managing the unexpected (15,44) 
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Weick states that these bridging operations are necessary between the intrasubjective, 
intersubjective, and generic subjective levels of organisation, and refers to this as organising. 
An example in illustration of this concept is the organising within Israeli Military Intelligence 
(AMAN) prior to the Yom Kippur surprise of 1973. This is evident in the work of Bar-
Joseph355 and Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski.356 They described how senior AMAN officers, 
Maj. Gen. Eli Zeira and Lt.-Col. Yona Bandman, were incapable of accepting information 
from junior AMAN analysts that contradicted their “conception” or framework of when and 
how war would break out. In essence, a failure to bridge between the intra- and 
intersubjective levels of sensemaking, together with an inability to reframe, may be seen as 
contributing factors to the surprise Israel suffered at the start of the Yom Kippur war. 
This bridging failure between the intra- and intersubjective level has its roots in tension 
between the generic subjective and intersubjective levels. Old organisational scripts, routines 
and habituated action patterns were not updated sufficiently with modifying scripts in the 
face of extreme uncertainty and ambiguity during the run-up to the war. Bar-Joseph and 
Kruglanski357 also posit that both officers had a tendency to view the military situation in 
terms of Popperian “clocks” (highly precise and unequivocal) rather than “clouds” 
(ambiguous and a variety of possibilities). This failure to realize the complex nature of the 
situation contributed to the surprise.  
This shows that warning does not operate in a vacuum of the individual warning analyst. 
How organisations organise, influences how sense is made of warning signals. Warning 
systems in organisations would need to follow a progression of bridging operations across 
these specific levels in order to make sense of signals and cues. In essence, a sequence of 
bridging events would need to take place from a sensemaking perspective for the appropriate 
organisational heeding of warning signals. 
4.3.2.1 Warning Event Bridging 
In a formal warning intelligence unit, department or ad hoc functional body, an event 
sequence from a sensemaking perspective needs to occur to place the organisation in a state 
of warning.  This sequence is also applicable to organisations that do not have formalised 
structures in place to deal with warning or countering surprise. Building on Weick’s concept 
                                                 
355 Bar-Joseph, U 2005. The Watchman Fell Asleep… (45-47, 235-251) 
356 Bar-Joseph, U & Kruglanski, AW 2003. Intelligence Failure and the Need… (79,82) 
357 Bar-Joseph, U & Kruglanski, AW 2003. Intelligence Failure and the Need… (83) 
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of bridging, a Warning Event Bridging (WEB) sequence is proposed below to explain 
framing operations from an early warning system organisational perspective. This WEB 
sequence has various circular or iterative processes between the various levels and is outlined 
as follows:  
1. Analysts make their expectations explicit and create indicator lists to start monitoring 
for indications – which is in effect a belief-driven form of sensemaking (taking into 
account that as part of an on-going process the expectations will be updated 
continuously due to reframing). 
2. Cues and signals then need to be noticed by individuals in the organisation – noticing 
is contingent on the content of frames from an individual and organisational 
perspective. 
3. The noticed cue or signal needs to be connected or placed within a frame in order for 
a unit of meaning to be formed. 
4. The individual makes sense of the noticed cues or signals, within the context of 
Weick’s seven properties, by fusing or welding together a set of meanings from what 
the individual’s senses noticed. 
5. The sense that was made by the individual now needs to be bridged from the 
intrasubjective to the intersubjective level – the “I” to the “we”. 
6. Once the intersubjective level has been bridged, further bridging to the generic 
subjective needs to take place as habituated action patterns, interlocking routines and 
scripts need to be adapted to institute meaningful action to mitigate the risk and 
warning triggered by the cue or signal noticed. 
This WEB sequence is complex due to the numerous variables and processes that come into 
play, not to mention cognitive analytical biases, which fall outside the scope of this thesis. It 
has various circular elements analogous to the principles of Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical circle,358 in particular framing and reframing operations on an individual and 
                                                 
358 Hermeneutics refers to the nature and means of interpretation or theory of interpretation. The circle signifies 
a methodological process of understanding. In order to understand the meaning of the whole and coming to 
understand the parts are interdependent activities. As Schwandt (2007:133) states, “construing the meaning 
of a whole meant making sense of the parts, and grasping the meaning of the parts depended on having some 
sense of the whole.” Heidegger and Gadamer placed more radical and stronger emphasis on the notion of the 
hermeneutical circle. They see the circularity of interpretation not merely a methodological principle, but 
rather an important feature of all knowledge and understanding. (Schwandt, 2007:134). See also Heidegger 
Heidegger, M. 1971. On the way to language. New York: Harper & Row Publishers and Gadamer, H 1982. 
Truth and method. New York: Crossroad 
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organisational level. The hermeneutical circle may be used as a metaphor to describe the 
relationship between cues/data and frames in the reframing process and the reframing of 
generic subjectivity and authoring of new scripts, routines and habituated action patterns. 
 
Figure 15 - The WEB Sequence359 
This circularity is evident at the level of the warning analyst (intrasubjective) and the warning 
organisation (inter and generic -subjective). While Khalsa’s model of the analyst warning 
process (depicted in figure 14 on page 75) operates in the foreground, and is a representation 
of a methodological process, the WEB sequence (figure 15) operates in the background and is 
a representation of Weick’s concept of organising. However, the success of the warning 
process is dependent on the organisational reframing ability within the WEB sequence, as 
continuous reframing operations are necessary on both levels. 
 
 
                                                 
359 Self-constructed, based on Weick 1995 and Klein Et al. 2007 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 84 
4.3.2.2 Intrasubjective level reframing within the WEB Sequence  
The merits of Weick’s sensemaking as applied to an individual analyst’s sensemaking was 
discussed in earlier sections of this chapter. This being said it must be emphasised that 
Weick’s sensemaking is an inherently social process. However, Gary Klein’s360 data/frame 
theory of sensemaking which is focused on individual sensemaking on the intrasubjective 
level is compatible and consistent with Weick’s sensemaking on this level. Both contribute to 
the comprehension of framing operations at the intrasubjective level of the WEB sequence. 
In this regard, Weick and Klein regularly reference each other’s work in building their 
respective theories of sensemaking.361 Attfield and Blandford also recognize that both Weick 
and Klein focus on the interdependency between data and frame (Klein) and cue and frame 
(Weick).362 Both Russell363 and Klein364 focus on the sensemaking processes of individuals 
and do not take cognisance of how interaction between individuals may affect the 
sensemaking process.365 Klein Et al.366 and Sieck Et al.367 propose the data/frame model of 
sensemaking which consists of six separate functions; 1) elaborating the frame, 2) 
questioning the frame, 3) preserving the frame, 4) comparing frames, 5) seeking a frame, and 
6) reframing. Figure 16, page 85, illustrates the interaction and sequence of these six 
functions.  
                                                 
360 Klein Et al. 2007 A data/frame theory of sensemaking 
361Sieck Et al. 2007. Technical Report 1200, Focus: A Model for Sensemaking ; Weick, KE. 1995. Sensemaking 
in Organizations (111,146,172); Weick Et al. 2005. Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking (409-421); 
Klein, GA 2009. Streetlights and Shadows (134) 
362 Attfield, S & Blandford, A 2011. Making sense of digital footprints (41) 
363 Russell, Et al. 1993. The Cost Structure of Sensemaking (269-276) 
364 Klein Et al. 2007 A data-frame theory of sensemaking 
365 Paul, SA & Morris, MR 2011. Sensemaking in collaborative web search (78) 
366 Klein, G  Moon, B & Hoffman, RR 2006b. Making sense of sensemaking 2 (90-92) 
367 Sieck Et al. 2007. Technical Report 1200, FOCUS: A Model for Sensemaking (1-28) 
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Figure 16 - Klein's Data-Frame Model of Sensemaking368 
Equivalent to Weick, Klein refers to a frame as “an explanatory structure that defines entities 
by describing their relationship to other entities.” Frames take the form of stories, scripts and 
maps, and the frame itself filters, defines and connects data.369 Klein Et al. refer to mental 
models which they define as “our causal understanding of the ways things work” that can 
also take the form of stories “as we imagine the sequence of events.”370 Klein Et al.371 and 
Sieck Et al.372 state that comprehensive mental model development for a complex open 
system is unrealistic. Rather, it is a set of fragmentary mental models that contribute to the 
frame that is constructed by an individual making sense, and this constructed frame guides 
the selection and interpretation of data. The suggestion that comprehensive mental model 
development is unrealistic is on par with Weick’s373 assertion that sensemaking is driven by 
plausibility, pragmatism and reasonableness rather than accuracy. 
This idea of “a set of fragmentary mental models that contribute” to the construction of a 
frame is supported by Weick’s contention reported earlier, that theories of action are 
                                                 
368 Sieck Et al. 2007. Technical Report 1200, FOCUS: A Model for Sensemaking 
369 Klein Et al.  2007. A data-frame theory of sensemaking (118) 
370 Klein Et al.  2007. A data-frame theory of sensemaking (130) 
371 Klein Et al.  2007. A data-frame theory of sensemaking (130-132) 
372 Sieck Et al. 2007. Technical Report 1200, FOCUS: A Model for Sensemaking (vi) 
373 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (57) 
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abstractions that simplify in the interest of action. Similarly, in terms of traditions or stories, 
only patterns or images of action can be transmitted or handed down because concrete human 
action can only be sustained in symbolic form. Likewise, with stories or vocabularies of 
sequence - when individuals translate their lives or “guides to conduct” into narrative form, 
the stories that result do not duplicate the experience. The story that results is a filtered one. 
Furthermore, the importance of the effect of indexicality on the noticing of cues as 
highlighted by Weick374 is equivalent to the conclusions of Sieck Et al. that the context of a 
situation defines what data is noticed. The purpose of the frame is to define and describe 
elements of the situation, significance of these elements, relationships, filtering of relevant 
and irrelevant messages and importantly the context – not just the data alone.375 The process 
of “fitting data into a frame” helps with the filtering and interpretation of data while testing 
and improving the frame.  
Weick’s argument for the embellishment and elaboration of cues is supported by Sieck Et 
al.’s notion that data elements are not accurate or perfect representations of a situation but 
rather a constructed one. That the “initial one or two key data elements serves as anchors” 
and affect what frame is adopted.376 However, as Weick states, it is the “drawing on 
something”, the implicit or explicit operation of a frame, within which these data elements or 
cues are noticed in the first place that is important.377 Concomitantly, Klein, Moon and 
Hoffman state that “recognizing a frame and recognizing data are different from elaborating a 
frame that has already been adopted.”378 They see this as a “two way street” where frames 
shape and define relevant data and the data also decrees what frame will change in a 
fundamental way379 leading credence to the hermeneutical metaphor referenced earlier.  
4.3.2.3 Intersubjective and generic subjective level reframing within the WEB Sequence  
As part of the WEB sequence from an organisational point of view, there is circularity or 
reframing present in the creation and adoption of Weick’s minimal sensible structures 
between the intersubjective and generic subjective levels. During periods of union and 
                                                 
374 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (52-53) 
375 Sieck Et al. 2007. Technical Report 1200, FOCUS: A Model for Sensemaking (8) 
376 Sieck Et al. 2007. Technical Report 1200, FOCUS: A Model for Sensemaking (8) 
377 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (109) 
378 Klein, G Moon, B & Hoffman, RR 2006b. Making Sense of Sensemaking 2 (88) 
379 Klein, G Moon, B & Hoffman, RR 2006b. Making Sense of Sensemaking 2 (88) 
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stability an attribute of generic subjectivity is a reliance on scripts, interlocking routines and 
habituated action patterns that ratify. During periods of uncertainty these scripts no longer 
work and a shift back to the intersubjective is necessitated in order to reframe or modify 
existing scripts. The old scripts do not fall away, they serve as seeds or new templates and are 
mixed between the intersubjective and generic subjective. The WEB sequence is a highly 
iterative and continuous process and cannot be seen as a linear step-for-step sequence with a 
beginning and end. As shown, there is circularity on all levels as individuals and 
organisations make sense of signals in their warning environment. 
Weick and Sutcliff provide direction in terms of maintaining a high level of reframing 
operations in warning organisations by equating them with High Reliability Organisations 
that entrench the capability of “mindfulness.” This is achieved by complimenting and 
embedding anticipatory activities from an organisational perspective. These activities include 
learning from failure, complicating perceptions, a commitment to resilience and remaining 
sensitive to operations. In specific the sensitivity to operations is notable. This refers to an 
attentiveness to “[the] front line, where the real work gets done.”380 The “Big Picture,” as 
they state, is less strategic and more situationally located. Well-developed situational 
awareness promotes continuous adjustments in the warning system that facilitates noticing. 
The link between sensitivity to operations and relationships, counteract a situation where fear 
of “speaking up” enacts an ineffective warning system. Again the Yom Kippur intelligence 
failure provides a good example. 
Lt.-Col. Bandman and Maj. Genl. Zeira had a significant effect on how junior intelligence 
officers analysed information received from a host of HUMINT and SIGINT381 sources 
before the outbreak of the war. Both officers exhibited an authoritarian and decisive 
managerial style. They did not allow open discussions relating to alternative viewpoints of 
the junior officers, which countered their current and reigning intelligence assessment of 
Egyptian military capabilities and intent to attack Israel. Junior officers who openly 
questioned the current intelligence assessment or conception were also threatened that their 
promotions would be overlooked.382 In effect, mindfulness as a capability, was not embedded 
                                                 
380 Weick, KE & Sutcliffe, KM 2001. Managing the unexpected (13) 
381 HUMINT – Human Intelligence, SIGINT – Signal Intelligence – these are standard acronyms used in the 
intelligence environment to categorize the different sources of information that feed an intelligence system 
others are OSINT – Open source intelligence  
382 Bar-Joseph, U & Kruglanski, AW 2003. Intelligence failure and the need for cognitive closure (84) 
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in AMAN, and this encumbered their ability to reframe the operational picture in their minds 
as to what was occurring in the lead-up to the Egyptian invasion. 
4.4 Visual Analytics software and Weick 
The influence of framing and reframing on scanning was briefly discussed previously in that 
it sets the target boundaries of environmental scanning systems operating within early 
warning systems. The collection of vast amounts of information relative to the collection 
plans, which are based on indicator development, is a core functional requirement within 
early warning systems. This has to be processed by analysts as an important component in the 
warning analysis process. In current warning environments, big data is becoming problematic 
in terms of its velocity, variety and volume passing through the scanning and warning system. 
The use of technology, in particular software, can alleviate this problematic situation, but the 
strengths and weaknesses of software in the warning process need to be understood. 
Sense of weak signals and warning signs are made against a milieu of Weick’s initiating 
conditions such as turbulence, info load and complexity.383 In the aftermath of 9/11, the 
development of Visual Analytics has attempted to turn the issue of information load into an 
opportunity. This section assesses issues and problems relating to models in Visual Analytics 
and their capability to support analysts’ sensemaking as per Weick’s theory of sensemaking.  
Making sense of signals in a complex environment, with the help of technology to bracket 
salient features and cues in a constant flow of information, is also a key element of early 
warning systems and the military Command, Control, Communication, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) environment. Weick384 specifically 
recognises the importance of the relationship between sensemaking and information 
technology. He sees “a disparity between the speed and complexity of information 
technology and the ability of humans to comprehend the outputs of the technology” and 
views military command systems as the “canary in the coal mine” alerting us to potential 
problems. Weick385 views Lanir’s386, summation, that humans cannot fully meet the 
requirements of the normative rational model of decision making, but they can design 
systems that do so, as key to this issue. The issue here is that once these systems are in place, 
                                                 
383 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (85) 
384 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (177) 
385 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (178) 
386 Lanir, Z 1989. The reasonable choice of disaster… (479-493) 
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military decision makers find it hard to challenge them. Lanir found that as alertness and 
complexity increases, C3I early warning systems387 place decision-makers under pressure as 
the causal logic underpinning these systems discards the cognitive quality of reframing or 
“repunctuation of the punctuated.” 
Furthermore, Tsoukas388 states that the growth and development of information and 
communication technology has created a society that is fundamentally dependent on 
knowledge for its functioning. This dependency on, and availability of information in the 
knowledge society, is a paradox in the sense that it has increased uncertainty and 
unpredictability. Hence, the availability of information in the emerging knowledge society 
contributes to the complex environment within which early warning systems need to 
function. 
Tying directly with Tsoukas’ statement above are Weick’s389 three initiating conditions that 
lead to ambiguity and uncertainty as occasions for sensemaking. These initiating conditions 
or properties relate to the probability that individuals will notice what is happening around 
them.  The first is information load which is a “complex mixture of the quantity, ambiguity, 
and variety of information that people are forced to process.” The second is an increase in 
complexity, which can increase uncertainty, and the third, turbulence, which is a combination 
of instability and randomness.  
Weick has a specific interest in information load as an occasion for sensemaking. He directs 
his attention to its “sheer volume” and views it as “a generic property in the flow of events.” 
As this load increases, individuals take steps to manage it by omission, queuing, filtering and 
abstracting. Information load is an important link in this thesis in tying the concepts of 
software, in general, and Visual Analytics, in particular, to early warning systems, 
sensemaking and signals. To paraphrase Weick:  
My interest in load is that, in their effort to cope with a generic property in the flow 
of events, namely, its sheer volume, people punctuate that flow in predictable ways 
(e.g. they neglect large portions of it). Those punctuations they do make highlight 
portions of the residual and heighten its impact on subsequent sensemaking. Any 
device that reduces information prestructures what people will notice and affects 
                                                 
387 C3I is a precursor term to C4ISR 
388 Tsoukas, H 2005. Complex Knowledge (21, 31-34) 
389 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (86-87) 
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the sense they then can make. Information load, in other words, is an occasion for 
sensemaking because it forces cues out of an ongoing flow.390 
Within warning systems, the different collection domains such as HUMINT, SIGINT, 
MASINT and OSINT result in very high volumes of information that need to be collated, 
assessed and analysed within a reasonable time frame to ensure relevance and usability of the 
information gathered. In this respect, there is an understandable focus on the Pirolli and Card 
notional sense-making model from a Visual Analytics perspective - because of the focus on 
negating or mitigating the cost, and effort, of the analyst working with large data sets. As 
shown in Chapter Two, other models are available that describe sense-making during the 
Visual Analytics process. These reported models are not without problems, on both a 
conceptual and technological level. 
4.4.1 Supporting analysts’ sensemaking? 
There is an emphasis in Visual Analytics on mitigating the information load on the analyst 
during the analytical process. Weick’s391 distinction between ignorance and equivocality has 
bearing on Visual Analytics in terms of its ability to resolve instances of both uncertainty and 
equivocality. Visual Analytics may facilitate a more varied and rich filtering of information 
in the visualization of larger data sets, but is it likely to resolve situations that require the 
solving of paradoxical or equivocal situations? 
The importance of noticing, and that it is an informal involuntary beginning to sensemaking, 
is another key aspect in viewing the contribution of Weick’s sensemaking relative to Visual 
Analytics. As Weick states, noticing refers to activities of filtering, classification and 
comparison. Similarly, the marshalling, processing, and analysis of data and information in 
order to create a specification, culminating in a visual representation, is an act of filtering, 
classification, and comparison. Filtering information, forces cues out of the ongoing stream 
of experience, which is an act of framing. The “connecting the dots” metaphor is also used 
regularly in Visual Analytics’ literature,392 but does it facilitate the noticing of dots? 
Weick’s minimal sensible structures (content of frames), as well as his emphasis on the 
importance of the sequence of noticing, extracting and subsequent elaboration of cues, is 
                                                 
390 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (87) 
391 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (95) 
392 Shrinivasan, YB & Gotz, D  2009. Connecting the dots with related notes; Naranjo, D 2013. Connecting the 
Dots: Examining Visualization Techniques for Enterprise Architecture Model Analysis  
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directly related to Klein’s question of “What counts as a dot?” This is where expertise and 
tacit knowledge come into play, as Klein states, “our expertise is as much about recognizing 
legitimate dots as about connecting them.” The metaphor “connecting the dots” does not 
emphasise the need to notice and identify cues in the first instance. Klein emphasises the key 
role of intuition, which he defines as “ways we use experience without consciously thinking 
things out.”393 This includes tacit knowledge and the ability to recognize patterns stored in 
our memory. 
Data and information collected via the scanning process are transformed by an analyst 
according to a specification. This specification may include hardware, applied algorithms and 
elements such as format conversion, data augmentation, marshalling and modelling of 
information. Furthermore, the analysts may also make a decision as to which collected 
information sets will be included in the specification.394 
The creation of a specification determines which portion of collected data or information is 
visualised. Therefore, it pre-structures what the analyst will notice in the visual representation 
and affects what sense is made. However, analysts with a larger or more varied repertoire of 
frames will notice more salient cues than those with a less varied repertoire. Consequently, 
this larger and more varied repertoire of frames will result in a more elaborate specification 
for a representation. Minimal sensible structures, representing the content of frames, are 
imposed upon the representation via expectation as a belief-driven form of sensemaking. The 
only difference from a Visual Analytics perspective is that it is by visual cues. 
4.4.1.1 Visual cues 
Dix Et al. refer to the concept of distributed cognition, which relates to a theoretical 
framework describing interaction between persons and artefacts in an information space. This 
theoretical framework extends the problem space boundaries to incorporate knowledge in the 
mind of the user and in the world. They see everyday problem solving as a “co-ordinated use 
of knowledge systems in the mind, in our environment, and other individuals.” 395 This co-
ordinated use of knowledge systems allows for “insight discovery” which they define as 
visual cues recognised via a “complex process of sensemaking [through] the exploration of 
information presented by visualisation.” They refer to “insight” or visual cues as an 
                                                 
393 Klein, R 2009. Streetlights and Shadows (71) 
394 Personal communication – Russell Arnott, Chief Data and Information Specialist, Suritec 2013 
395 Dix Et al. 2010. Perception and cognitive aspects (114-116) 
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individualised “observation about the data by the participant, a unit of discovery.” The 
characteristics of insight or visual cues are: (1) complexity, (2) “deep” in the sense that they 
build over time and are not exact, (3) unexpected, and (4) relevant.396 The latter 
characteristics match some of Weick’s properties of sensemaking as well as his “seed” 
analogy for cues. However, Dix Et al.’s  “unexpected” characteristic is likely to refer to the 
“surprise” or autonomic arousal associated with noticing unexpected cues  as discussed in an 
earlier section of this chapter.  
Sense is made, as per Weick’s seven properties of sensemaking, of noticed visual cues in a 
visualisation determined by a specification. Although it is important to take into account that 
it is a highly filtered visualisation. The expectations that were used to form the basis for 
identified indicators, which provided a collection plan that directed scanning behaviour, are 
also at play in determining the earlier specification. This is illustrated in figure 17, page 93. 
Three iterations are depicted. The orange iteration represents the noticing of a visual cue. 
This triggers the development of the second (green iteration) specification, resulting in a new 
(green) visualisation. This then enables the embellishment and elaboration of the original cue 
noticed in the orange visualisation. This leads to reframing as the content of the analyst’s 
frames are updated and meaning is ascribed to the embellished cue noticed in the 
visualisation. The sense made results in the updating of expectations, which in turn leads to 
the updating of the indicator list represented by the third iteration (black). Visual Analytics 
also allow for interactive updating of visualisations without affecting the specification. This 
iteration is not illustrated in the diagram.  
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Figure 17 -  Expectations to Visualisation397 
4.4.1.2 Focal and subsidiary awareness in relation to specifications, visualisations and 
tacit knowledge 
In the present Visual Analytics process, an analyst has a focal awareness of the specification 
and visualisation, whilst his tacit knowledge operates on a subsidiary awareness level to 
recognise salient cues and patterns in the visualisation. It is this subsidiary awareness of the 
minimal sensible structures, which will enable the analyst to connect plausible visual cues to 
expectations. In this regard, a situation has been created where both tacit and explicit 
knowledge of the analyst interacts with that visualisation. Expectations are made explicit via 
the process of indicator identification which drives the scanning process. The minimal 
sensible structures will be highly tacit as the analyst interacts with the visualisation. 
Accordingly, it will not be possible to articulate or convert all minimal sensible structures or 
                                                 
397 Self-constructed, based on Weick 1995, Khalsa 2009 and, Van Wijk 2005 
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the content of analyst’s frames into explicit knowledge. As Weick states: “There is always 
slippage between words and what they refer to.”398  
In support of this, a similar analogy would be the interpretation of radar consoles or human 
machine interfaces (HMI). Different radar types require distinctive signal processing and 
have specific use characteristics.399 It would be very difficult to provide explicit knowledge in 
document form to train an individual in interpreting radar signals from ground surveillance 
radars (GSR). Understanding of the signal plots and tracks within a clutter background in an 
HMI can only be conveyed through experiential learning under supervision of an expert radar 
operator. This knowledge cannot be readily articulated. Furthermore, the same GSR radar 
console operator would have difficulty interpreting maritime or air surveillance radar. Again, 
the different signal interpretation nuances can only be acquired through experiential learning 
and guidance from a seasoned operator. Some of the knowledge necessary to operate the 
console can be made explicit but the highly nuanced radar specific interpretation within the 
HMI remains highly tacit. 
The essence here is that tacit and explicit knowledge are not two opposing sides on a 
continuum, but rather two sides of the same coin - “even the most explicit kind of knowledge 
is underlain by tacit knowledge.” In particular Tsoukas400 argues that:  
to treat practical or (tacit) knowledge as having a precisely definable content, 
which is located in the head of the practitioner and then ‘translated’ (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995: 105) into explicit knowledge, is to reduce what is known to what is 
articulable, thus impoverishing the notion of practical knowledge.  
Of importance here is the subsidiary knowledge associated with the tacit knowledge of the 
user. Polanyi as quoted by Tsoukas401 states that “subsidiary or instrumental knowledge is not 
known in itself but is known in terms of something focally known, to the quality of which it 
contributes; and to this extent it is unspecifiable.” Tsoukas explains subsidiary awareness 
using the analogy of thinking about hitting a nail with a hammer.402 Hitting the nail with the 
hammer is the main objective. However, I am aware of the feeling of the hammer in my hand 
                                                 
398 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (106) 
399 Unknown Author, Radar Fundamentals, Chapter 1,  NAVMARCORMARS Operator (NMO) Courses; Basic 
Radar Tutorial Website http://www.radartutorial.eu/index.en.html , accessed 2012-11-17 
400 Tsoukas, H 2005. Complex Knowledge (154-155) 
401 Tsoukas, H 2005. Complex Knowledge (146) 
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and I also know and rely on the feelings (sensations) in my hand when hitting the nail into a 
piece of wood. This is a subsidiary awareness of the feelings in my hand combined with a 
focal awareness of using the hammer to drive the nail into the wood. Subsidiary and focal 
awareness are mutually exclusive. Similarly, confusion reigns when a pianist shifts attention 
from the piece being played to the movement of his or her fingers. 
In the case of the radar console or HMI, the operator has a subsidiary awareness of the 
nuanced signal processing and behaviour of radar energy reflections within the type specific 
radar learned through experiential learning. Conversely, the operator has a focal awareness of 
the HMI as a tool to interpret the radar signal environment. The experienced operator has a 
richer subsidiary awareness allowing for an increased accuracy in interpreting signal plots in 
an HMI. 
Tsoukas argues403 that tacit knowledge is triangular in nature taking into account the 
relationship between subsidiary particulars, the focal target and the linkage by the knower. 
This integration of the subsidiary to the focal target is essentially tacit in nature and 
irreversible. The structural components of tacit knowledge are threefold: the functional, the 
phenomenal and the semantic. Functional consists of the subsidiary to the focal target whilst 
the phenomenal involves transformation of subsidiary experience into a new sensory 
experience. The semantic aspect represents the meaning of the subsidiary – “the focal target 
on which they bear.” 
In terms of focusing on information load as an opportunity or initiating condition for 
sensemaking, Visual Analytics certainly has the ability to force cues and signals out of a flow 
of events. The iterative development of specifications as well as visualizations, allow for the 
“repunctuation of the punctuated” and does not discard the cognitive quality of reframing. 
Strictly speaking,  the  nature of Visual Analytics software, particularly the focus on data and 
information processing to create a specification, only solves problem scenarios where 
uncertainty creates a state of ignorance due to lack of information. However, sensemaking is 
a social process and focused on identity construction. In equivocal situations, where multiple 
meanings reign, nothing prevents an analyst from indulging in collaborative interaction with 
colleagues or experts regarding a visualisation. The resulting meaning may then be integrated 
within the next iteration to create an updated specification for a visualisation.  
                                                 
403 Tsoukas, H 2005. Complex Knowledge (146-148) 
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Visual analytics employed in a collaborative scenario should ensure a more varied input in 
the determination of the specification that will then result in a pre-structuring or filtering of 
information that enhances the capability of team members to notice cues. Weick404 
emphatically states that the content of frames “pervades organizations” and “colors 
interpretations” and are at play all of the time. Understanding how these frames operate both 
from the level of the individual was well as the organisational context will enhance cue 
recognition. Sensemaking, as Weick states, is never a solitary undertaking and what an 
individual analyst does internally “is contingent on others.” 
4.4.2   Representation construction (sense-making) or sensemaking (Weick)? 
In promoting a socio-cognitive approach to knowledge transfer, Ringsberg and Reihlen405 
argue that the use of technology, “in specific computer memory systems”, has added to the 
myth that knowledge can exist in “disembodied structures such as databases, files texts and 
instructions.” This “myth” also includes the notion that this knowledge is stored with “self-
evident meaning independent of the inquiring and interpreting mind.” In a separate study, the 
two authors demonstrated empirically that knowledge artefacts depend on individuals’ 
understanding and interpretation of it. In this study, consultants constructed different 
interpretations of the same data source stored in a digital knowledge management system. In 
support, they cite Mahner and Bunge’s406 argument “that the meaning of information always 
depends on the mindful receiver.” 
4.4.2.1 The ineffability of tacit knowledge 
Wang Et al.’s 407statement (in Chapter Two), that explicit knowledge is “independent from 
the user or his tacit knowledge” is problematic. Tsoukas408 in particular, has commented on 
the misunderstanding in management sciences relating to the concept of tacit knowledge. He 
argues that Nonaka and Takeuchi’s interpretation of tacit knowledge as “knowledge-not-yet-
articulated” or knowledge awaiting its “translation” or “conversion” into explicit knowledge 
                                                 
404 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (132)  
405 Ringberg, T and Reihling, M 2008. Towards a socio-cognitive approach to knowledge transfer (915) 
406 Mahner, M and Bunge, MA 1997. Foundations of Biophilosophy, as cited in Ringberg, T & Reihling, M. 
2008. Towards a socio-cognitive approach to knowledge transfer (915) 
407 Wang Et al. 2009.Defining and applying knowledge conversion processes… (617) 
408 Tsoukas, H 2005. Complex Knowledge (141-161) 
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is erroneous. Tsoukas states that this interpretation ignores “the essential ineffability of tacit 
knowledge” and thus reduces it to what may be articulated.409  
Furthermore, in reference back to Wang Et al.’s410 addition of a knowledge base (KB) to Van 
Wijks model (Chapter Two), they emphasise the representation of such a knowledge base via 
ontological knowledge structures. Ontology from this perspective likely refers to Gruber’s 
definition of Ontology, that of “[an] explicit specification for a conceptualisation.”411 Babaie 
Et al.412 refers to this as a structured depiction that is centred on the identification of concepts 
in a domain, their explicit definitions and how they relate to each other in order to make them 
machine-readable. 
This machine readability is facilitated through the construction of taxonomies that are 
formalised in topic maps through use of languages such as Extensible Markup Language 
(XML) or Resource Definition Framework (RDF). In addition, standards, such as ISO 13250 
Topic Maps,413 provide a basis to formalise groupings of information objects around topics 
and “occurrences” of the topics, and the relationships between topics and the “associations” 
in a data structure. This data structure then follows a Topic – Association – Occurrence 
mapping. It enables the machine readability of “knowledge structures” across various 
software systems but, as raised by authors such as Aaltonen,414 Weick415 and Snowdon,416 is 
problematic from an ontological perspective. 
This problem relates to what different ontological domains of ordered, complex and chaotic 
require in terms of making sense. The process as proposed by Wang Et al. (Chapter Two)  
will be sufficient in an ordered setting but will most likely breakdown in dealing with 
complex or chaotic situations. The mutual exclusivity of taxonomic structures needed for 
machine readability will not be able to cope in chaotic situations, where the number of topics 
and possible associations with occurrences are unknowable. Furthermore, the data – 
information – knowledge (DIK) approach, on which Wang Et al. base their addition to van 
                                                 
409 Tsoukas, H 2005. Complex Knowledge (158) 
410 Wang Et al. 2009. Defining and applying knowledge conversion processes… (617) 
411 Gruber, TR 1993. Towards Principles for the Design of Ontologies… (1) 
412 Babaie Et al. 2006. Designing a modular architecture… (271) 
413 http://www.isotopicmaps.org ; http://www.topicmaps.org  
414 Aaltonen, M 2007. Strategic Decision-making 
415 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (178) 
416 Kurtz, CF and Snowden, DJ 2003. The new dynamics of strategy (462-483) 
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Wijk’s model, does not take into the account the complex relationship between explicit and 
tacit knowledge as articulated by Tsoukas.417 As illustrated in the previous section, this 
compounds the failure of machine readable ontologies in the face of complex and chaotic 
situations. 
In addition, problems were recently highlighted in the analyses of very large data sets relative 
to Visual Analytics within the United States’ Distributed Common Ground System-Army418 
(DCGS-A). These range from the overwhelming of advanced 3-D visual analytic support 
tools when the number of analysed nodes run into the tens of thousands to problems of 
scalability of data volumes.419 Estes420 posits that there is “no fixed ontology or model that 
can characterize the key data into knowledge for all time.” The lesson learned for Estes is that 
a fixed ontology forces a compromise between depth and breadth and affects adaptability 
because it cannot handle the subtleties in situations.  
4.4.2.2 Design issues and problems in Visual Analytics 
Wong and Varga421 in reporting design issues of Visual Analytics systems, have listed three 
important related problems. The first is the keyhole problem, which relates to the data issues 
where a small sub-set of data is used because of computational constraints. Without 
understanding the context relative to the large dataset from which the subset was derived, 
determining the significance of visualisations is difficult. The second problem, black holes, 
relate to missing or incomplete data in a dataset. Visual Analytics systems cannot construct 
the missing data. The issue is more that analysts are not aware or do not know that data are 
missing, whether deliberate of through natural occurrence. The third is known as the brown 
                                                 
417 Tsoukas, H 2005. Complex Knowledge 
418The United States’ Distributed Common Ground System-Army418 (DCGS-A) has created an unprecedented 
amount of information drawing from a multitude of different sensors for the American war fighter. DCGS is 
a battlefield intelligence system that establishes a network-centric information platform that handles 
collaborative intelligence production, tasking of sensors and processing and exploitation of data. The main 
goal is to provide access to information to support battlefield visualisation, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) management within the US Army’s common operational environment. (Distributed 
Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A). Weapon Systems 2012. Available at: http://fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/land/wsh2012/88.pdf , accessed 2012-10-18. 
419 Heer (2008:106-107) have previously discussed problems and difficulties related to the available display size 
and screen resolution to visualize large datasets in a common desktop computer environment. Similarly 
Keim Et al.. (2008:166-167) have noted technical challenges relating to Visual Analytics and vast amounts 
of data such as: (1) scalability with data volumes and data dimensionality, (2) data quality and graphical 
representation, (3) visual representation and level of detail, (4) display devices and (5) user interfaces and 
infrastructure. Given these noted issues, the DSCG-A difficulties reported by Estes are not surprising. 
420 Estes, T 2011. Entity-centric advanced analytics using synthesys (29-31) 
421 Wong, BLW & Varga, M 2012. Black Holes, Keyholes and Brown Worms 
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worm problem, and refers to the detection and handling of deception and misleading data. 
There are analytical techniques such as Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) to 
estimate reliability of evidence but representing such in a Visual Analytics system is very 
difficult.  
The aforementioned highlights the problematic nature of Wang Et al.’s addition to Van Wijks 
model. In addition, Klein422 lends credence to this in his criticism of the data-information-
knowledge-wisdom “assembly line model” in which data is filtered to make sure decision 
makers get pre-digested material. Information search is, in a sense, removed from the control 
of the decision maker. This is typical of a situation Weick describes where premise controls 
(vocabularies of organisation) operate at higher levels of an organisational hierarchy because 
organisational designers use first and second order controls at lower levels of the 
organisation. This makes it difficult for decision makers to build their own mental models 
because they are forced to depend on “dots” and analyses of individuals at lower levels with 
less expertise. The context in which data was collected is obscured. Klein therefore states, 
that the assembly line model, only fits in orderly situations where only explicit knowledge is 
handled.  
In interacting with a visualisation an individual, working with a Visual Analytics software 
tool,  certainly has to work through a series of steps to create the visualisation.  This is where 
the representation construction model, such as that of Pirolli and Card describe this process 
which has a descriptive orientation. Similarly, Wang Et al.’s model tries to compensate for 
this description orientation by their additions to Van Wijk’s model. The representation 
models focus on the mechanical or task orientated process of actually filtering, classifying, 
and categorising data for visualisation, while Van Wijk’s model focuses on the cognitive 
reframing process while interacting with a visualisation and specification.  
Weick’s sensemaking not only extends, but fits well within Van Wijk’s visualisation model 
as well as Green Et al.’s adaptation of it. The seven properties of sensemaking provide a 
theoretical platform to evaluate how individuals will make sense of visualisations within an 
organisational context. In addition, the content of frames and the manner in which they are 
imposed on our experiences, especially expectations (belief-driven sensemaking), 
underscores the cognitive operations at play when users manipulate and interact in an 
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iterative process with visualizations. Iterative development of specifications and resulting 
visualizations are contingent of the process where data/cues are forced out of a visualization 
by frames but the data/cues also determine how a frame will be tested, elaborated, or 
changed. 
The problems associated with data management and the issues reported by Wong and Varga 
are problematic from an accuracy perspective for Visual Analytics. But herein lies the value 
of Weick’s sensemaking. It is about plausibility, not accuracy, it’s about extracting and 
embellishing cues, is ongoing, social and about enacting the environment. As Weick states, 
the strength of sensemaking is that it does not rely on accuracy, but rather plausibility, 
pragmatics, reasonableness and invention.423 Because cues may have multiple meanings it is 
important to get “some interpretation to start with than to postpone action.” Early warning is 
a time sensitive endeavour and “quick responses shape events before they become 
crystallized into a single meaning.”424 The use of “minimal cues” as Weick posits, is what 
gives adequate lead time so that one can adjust to events. Seen from within this perspective,  
sensemaking, as proposed by Weick, certainly provides a wider theoretical foundation for 
Visual Analytics on a level above the representation construction models. 
4.5  Conclusion 
This penultimate chapter shows that Weick’s theory of sensemaking makes a significant 
contribution to expanding our knowledge and understanding of sense, signals and software in 
early warning systems. The analysis has implications on both a theoretical and practical level 
and are discussed in detail in Chapter Five, which concludes this thesis. 
  
                                                 
423 Weick, KE 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations (57) 
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Chapter 5 
Implications: Sense, signal and 
software in early warning systems 
“An extracted cue is used to prophesy the nature of the referent from which it was extracted” 
– Karl Weick425 
 
 
5.1  The objective in retrospect 
This thesis set out to examine the contribution that Karl Weick’s theory of sensemaking can 
make to enhance weak signal analysis within warning systems. Two specific research goals 
were stated. The first was to reveal possible improvements in signal and cue recognition 
through an attentiveness to the frames theory of sensemaking in the analysis phase. The 
second goal was to show how it could be included into the theoretical foundation of Visual 
Analytics in support of warning systems. Given the recent intelligence and warning related 
failures within the military, security and financial environment since the events of 9/11, a re-
evaluation from within a sensemaking perspective can contribute to a strengthening of current 
theory underpinning signal analysis in early warning systems.  
This thesis did not include an evaluation of the effect of analytical or psychological bias on 
the part of analysts in relation to the noticing of weak signals and cues in a warning system. 
A large body of research exists which has considered these effects on analysis and 
intelligence analysis in particular. The effects are acknowledged but fall outside the scope of 
this thesis. In addition, the concept of framing is highly abstract and an ongoing process that 
forces cues and signals out of a constant stream of experience. This “ongoing” nature 
sometimes necessitated an artificial delimitation during analysis that viewed framing as a 
singular event. Consequently, it allowed for a window through which to view what Weick 
refers to as the substance of sensemaking, placing cues within frameworks to establish 
meaning.  
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The topic of warning, which Bodnar426 defines as “a prediction of the future,” had a distinct 
theoretical implication for this thesis. Arguments about the nature of the future and 
predictions of the future,  by authors such as Tsoukas427 and Narayanan and Fahley428, who 
posit that the future is, from an ontological perspective, non-existent, open-ended, and un-
knowable confirms the notion that the accuracy of weak signals or warning signs can only be 
determined retrospectively. 
In applying Weick’s theory of sensemaking to weak signals, warning systems analysis and 
Visual Analytics the following implications on a theoretical and practical level are evident. 
5.2 Implications for weak signals 
Karl Weick’s theory of sensemaking presents a framework that provides conceptual clarity to 
the concept of weak signals. Furthermore, weak signals as a concept is decidedly complex, a 
nominal or reductionist approach that seeks to define a set of characteristics fails to account 
for this complex nature. Weick’s construct of cues, in particular his “seed” metaphor, goes to 
the essence of what drives debates in the weak signal discourse. This metaphor underscores 
the vagueness and uncertainty of outcomes and that it is the embellishment and elaboration of 
cues that represent the progressive nature of weak signals. A weak signal is a representative, 
not a blueprint, of the entire datum429 from which it originates. 
Restated, as defined earlier430, from a Weickian perspective a weak signal is: 
The initial, vague or imprecise cue noticed, and then extracted, out of the present stream of 
experience, signposting some plausible future state, which then acts as a seeding platform for 
embellishment and elaboration in the ongoing sensemaking process, the ultimate effect of 
which can only be determined in retrospect. 
The content of our frames, as imposed by belief- or action-driven sensemaking, determines 
how we notice signals and cues. The ability to notice cues and signals, is entirely dependent  
on the richness and extent of the frames we are able to draw from. In the ongoing process of 
sensemaking, these weak signals are embellished as we continuously ascribe meanings to 
                                                 
426 Bodnar, JM 2003. Warning analysis for the information age… (11)  
427 Tsoukas, H 2005. Complex Knowledge (276) 
428 Narayanan, VK and Fahey, L 2004. Invention and navigation as contrasting metaphors… (39) 
429 See footnote 323 on page 72 
430 Page 74 above 
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them in an effort to make sense. The richness and range of the sensemaker’s frames will 
determine: 
1) If cues and signals are noticed in the first instance. By implication, the more varied 
and rich the individual’s repertoire of frames is, the more likely they will be noticed. 
2) The “weakness” of the noticed signal or cue. 
The “strengthening” of an extracted “weak” signal or cue refers to its subsequent and ongoing 
embellishment. The process of re-framing, which allows for the updating of our current 
frames enables the “re-punctuation of the punctuated.” This “two way street” or 
hermeneutical like process referred to earlier above, where our frames outline and define 
relevant cues and data and these cues and data also dictate what frame will change in an 
fundamental way, underscores the notion of “strengthening”. The ultimate potentiality of a 
weak signal, or what it will ultimately become, is only discernable in hind-sight, due to the 
retrospective nature of sensemaking.  
This lends support to Rossel’s431 earlier stated contention that all weak signals are “candidate 
weak signals, hypotheses or starting points for exploratory reflection”. The further 
embellishment of them, the ongoing nature, and the enactment of sensible environments, as 
per Weick’s properties of sensemaking, strengthens this notion and alludes to the “self-
fulfilling prophetic” nature of  the so called “weak signals” that were noticed in the first 
instance.  
The importance of “noticing” and the cardinal role that framing plays in the act of noticing 
signals and “dots” in warning systems was also confirmed. The ability to notice cues is 
paramount in making signals and cues available for analysis in a warning system. If they are 
not noticed, they are not available for sensemaking (you can only connect the dots after you 
have noticed them). This “noticeability” of cues is dependent on their indexicality or 
contextual nature represented by the frames that we impose on a sequence of events to 
extracts cues or signals. 
5.3  Implications for early warning systems 
It is evident that expectation, as a belief-driven form of sensemaking, in various permutations 
such as indicators432, “imaginability” of surprise433, and Rescher’s “mind invokingness”434 
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ensures that noticing becomes focused. In this regard, the thesis has demonstrated that belief-
driven sensemaking, in the form of expectations, are important in situations where the future 
potentiality of cues and signs need to be evaluated – such as weak signal analysis and early 
warning systems. Therefore, Weick’s sensemaking theory is of value in the early stages of 
early warning system analysis. Expectations ensure that noticing becomes more directed and 
attentive to the presence of discontinuity and threat in a surveillance and monitoring 
environment. 
Weick’s sensemaking, as applied from an organisational perspective to early warning 
systems, culminated in the construction of a descriptive sequence – Warning Event Bridging. 
The WEB sequence is a description of the framing operations at work during the warning 
process at both an individual and organisational level of analysis. To enable an adequate 
warning event, noticed cues need to be elaborated and bridged in terms of the WEB sequence 
of circular framing cycles between the intra-, inter- and generic subjective levels of 
sensemaking. Warning systems may be seen to operate on three interrelated planes as 
depicted in figure 18. 
 
Figure 18 - Early Warning: Process and Sensemaking Planes435 
                                                                                                                                                        
433 Mendonca Et al. 2004. Wild cards, weak signals… (203) 
434 Narayanan, VK and Fahey, L 2004. Invention and Navigation as contrasting metaphors… (54-55) 
435 Self-constructed, combination of Weick (1995) and Khalsa (2009) 
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5.3.1 The process plane 
The process plane relates to the actual processes in place from a functional perspective. 
Models that describe this process are represented by that of Khalsa,436 and notional models of 
intelligence analysis as represented by Pirolli and Card.437  
Weick’s concept of framing and reframing has an early influence in the early warning 
process. The result of this framing and reframing process is represented by a method of 
making expectancies explicit in the form of indicator lists. This can be improved by applying 
and embedding the principles of Weick’s concept of “mindfulness,” present in High 
Reliability Organisations, to early warning systems. The key is to ensure ongoing scrutiny, 
refinement and elaboration of expectations to ensure that the “invisible hand” of a simple set 
of expectations do not lead to surprise. The composition of a warning team, and the breadth 
or repertoire of frames present under the member analysts, will determine the range and mix 
of possible indicators generated. It will also increase the odds of noticing warning signs. 
Furthermore, methodological improvements in environmental scanning systems on their own, 
focused on identification of information sources, modes and methods, will not necessarily 
improve the efficacy of the scanning system. Scanning system enhancement is rather a 
combination of methodological improvements with, (1) a clear understanding of the influence 
and role of frames and reframing on analysts, (2) embedding “mindfulness”, and (3) 
facilitating the ability of analysts to make their expectations explicit in the form of indicator 
lists. When monitoring an environment this will facilitate the ability to focus attention on the 
noticing of cues and signals. 
Making expectations explicit categorises and delineates the scope of the scanning 
environment, which is in its self an act of filtering. There is, however, never a guarantee that 
analysts will notice all signals, as this is contingent on the variety, repertoire and continuous 
reframing of the content of the analysts’ frames. The wider the range of indicators, the higher 
the likelihood of noticing “indications” due to autonomic arousal of surprise caused by the 
cue not conforming to the expectations generated. 
The embedding of processes that facilitate the development of varied and nuanced 
expectations (reframing operations) within the process plane, represents the foundation of 
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indicator development. This in turn delivers the target boundaries and categories of the 
intelligence collection and scanning system. The intelligence collection plan completed 
during steps one and two (Process Plane, figure 18), is in effect an act of filtering. The 
conscious authoring of expectations, in the form of indicator lists, and within the perspective 
of mindfulness, determines the target environment, reach and categories of scanning. 
5.3.2  The individual sensemaking plane 
The second plane, represented by individual sensemaking, relates to the individual analysts 
within a warning system as a unit of analysis. In this regard the individual analyst notices 
cues or signals in the scanned environment. The boundaries and scope of the scanning 
systems are predetermined by the indicators generated by the expectancies of the analyst or 
group of analysts. Analysts notice “indications” of indicators, not the actual indicators or 
“indications” that are surprising due to not conforming to expectations. These “indications” 
relate back to the “weakness” or “wispiness” of the cue originally noticed in the scanned 
environment.  
There is an interdependency between the analyst’s frames and the cues or signals noticed. 
Not only are the signals embellished but the analyst’s frames are also updated and elaborated 
during the process of making sense. Once an analyst makes sense of a cue or signals and 
determines that the meaning of it represents a warning, this warning needs to be 
communicated to the warning organisation. 
The influence of Weick’s seven properties of sensemaking, together with frames and framing, 
appear ever present with analysts seeking to make sense of warning signals. 
5.3.3 The organisational sensemaking plane 
One cannot only evaluate framing operations from within a warning system at the individual 
level of analysis. Weick’s concept of organising, which are the operations necessary to bridge 
between the intrasubjective, intersubjective and generic subjective levels of organisation,  
drives home the notion that the sense must be made at an organisational level for warning to 
be successful. Specific examples were provided in illustration of this statement, such as the 
conditions present in AMAN prior to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war of 1973. 
Consequently, a Warning Event Bridging (WEB) sequence was proposed to represent the 
circular iterative processes, of framing and reframing, at these various levels of organisation , 
that are needed to ensure the heeding of warning signals. The aforementioned is a valuable 
contribution that Weick’s sensemaking can make to an effective early warning process. 
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Given that warning is an assessment of probabilities, a prediction of the future, and does not 
exist until communicated to policy and decision makers, organisational sensemaking of 
warning signals are crucial. Apart from the initial bridging between intrasubjective to 
intersubjective level, the individual analysts to the analyst group (“I” to the “we”), bridging 
operations between the intersubjective and generic subjective levels also needs to occur: 
Organisational scripts, routines and habituated action patterns need to be modified due to the 
uncertainty created by warning so that action can be taken to create organisational stability. 
An understanding of these three planes may facilitate an improved operation of early warning 
systems. This understanding provides a basis for creating improved warning structures that 
embed mindfulness and are cognisant of the notions of expectation, “re-punctuation of the 
punctuated” and warning event bridging sequences.  
5.4  Implications for Visual Analytics in warning systems 
In warning systems where Visual Analytics are employed to facilitate analysis and deal with 
situations characterised by high information load, Weick’s theory of sensemaking makes a 
significant theoretical contribution. It is critical that the role of framing is understood in terms 
of the analyst’s focal awareness of the specification and visualisation and his/her subsidiary 
awareness as represented by frames. Again, the implication of belief-driven sensemaking and 
the role that expectations play is present. The conscious act of creating or developing 
expectations (indicators) early in the warning analysis process ensures not only that noticing 
becomes more focused, but also at the same time ensures the elaboration of frames. 
Weick’s perspective is in harmony with Van Wijk and Green Et al.’s visualization models, 
but less so with Wang Et al.’s adaptation. His emphasis on “noticing” as an act of filtering, 
classification and comparison goes to the very nature of constructing a specification of data 
for the creation of a visualisation. A larger or more varied range of frames, on the side of 
analysts constructing specifications for visualisations, will result in the noticing of more 
salient cues and signals in a visualisation. 
The ability of Visual Analytics to include and facilitate framing and reframing operations in 
warning systems has been detailed in the previous chapter.438 If technology, and software in 
particular,  discards this cognitive ability of decision makers in situations where alertness and 
complexity is the norm, it places warning analysts and decision makers under pressure as it 
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abandons the “cognitive quality of reframing.”439 This relates to the ease of challenging and 
comprehending the outputs of information technology solutions. Visual Analytics as a 
software technology, does not attempt to constrain these outputs (visualisations) in an 
inflexible monolithic form.  
The creation of a specification by the warning analyst, occurs after data and information as 
part of the end-result of a scanning system (see figures 14,440 17,441 and 18442), is stored in a 
data storage structure. This specification construction is a further act of filtering, as it is a 
decision of the analyst as to what part of the collected data and information is eventually part 
of the interactive visualisation. However, the interactive nature of the visualisation, and the 
flexibility in changing the specification, facilitates an iterative process needed to support 
reframing operations.  
Weick’s theory of sensemaking supports Visual Analytics on a wider rather than a narrower 
perspective. Thomas and Cook443 may have trivialised the important contribution Weick’s 
work could make by: (1) Only referring to a set of “mental minimal sensible structures” and, 
(2) Categorising it as applicable at the organisational level and in a time scale of months and 
years. In noticing or recognising signals in an environment to provide adequate warning of 
some future event of positive or negative consequence, Weick’s444 substance of sensemaking, 
a frame, a cue and a connection, goes to the very essence required to recognise warning 
signals. In addition, the seven properties of sensemaking provide a theoretical framework that 
explains how analysts would make sense of visual cues and signals on both an individual and 
social level. The analyst’s reasoning does not take place in a sterile vacuum unaffected by 
variables such as identity construction – the events of the Mann Gulch disaster, have a similar 
bearing on warning analysts as was the case with the smoke jumper team. 
Current models in Visual Analytics focus on a mechanistic approach by analysing how it 
supports notional models and the various steps in the analyst’s analytical process. This is 
impoverished in a sense that it does not focus on the core issues around the properties of 
sensemaking such as plausibility, identity construction and their social nature. Some models 
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in Visual Analytics such as that of Wang Et al.445 prefer to perpetuate the myth that 
knowledge can exist in “disembodied” structures such as databases with indisputable 
meaning. To emphasise Lanir’s argument, the rigidity of formalised taxonomic structures 
cannot contend with complex situations where there are indeterminable outcomes for future 
possibilities. This is already creating issues in the United States Military’s Distributed 
Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A) as described earlier by Estes.446 
To this effect, the application of Weick’s theory of sensemaking, makes a valuable 
contribution to a more effective use of Visual Analytics in early warning systems. However, 
the focus of Visual Analytics in warning systems would likely be the interactive visualisation 
of collected information by the environmental scanning system. This implies that Visual 
Analytics would be more conducive to situations where uncertainty reigns and that the 
software could speed up the analyst’s task process. Nonetheless, the analyst’s frames are still 
in operation in forcing cues out of visualisations. Analysts are also able to engage other 
analysts in social interaction by arguing the merits of a particular visualisation if it creates an 
equivocal situation. 
There is also a pre-occupation with issues of accuracy in representations of specifications, 
such as missing information and the key-hole effect, which is viewed as problematic in 
warning and intelligence systems. However, the nature of Weick’s sensemaking, that 
plausibility is sufficient, that cues are embellished and that it is an ongoing process, directs 
attention to the iterative nature of Visual Analytics. Weick’s sensemaking focuses on the 
notion of plausibility rather than accuracy, and its progressive nature - that the meaning of 
initial cues and frames will be updated continuously while analysts make sense of them. 
Visual Analytics seen within this Weickian perspective not only speeds up the analysis 
process, and supports analysts’ short term memory processes with visualisations, but also 
contributes to reframing due to interactive specification and visualisation processes. The 
latter, simply stated, facilitates and supports the interaction of a warning analyst’s tacit and 
explicit knowledge. 
 
 
                                                 
445 Wang Et al. 2009. Defining and applying knowledge conversion processes 
446 Estes, T 2011. Entity-centric advanced analytics using synthesys  (29-31) 
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5.5  Final thoughts and comments 
The role that action-driven sensemaking in the form of commitment and manipulation can 
play in the noticing of cues in warning systems has not been fully considered in this thesis. 
Action can generate clarity in a confusing environment and more research is needed to 
facilitate ways of incorporating it into framing operations of warning analysts. 
The social nature of sensemaking drives home the importance of collaboration in the framing 
operations of warning analysts. This is equally applicable to Visual Analytics both from a 
specification and visualisation perspective. It is possible that individual analysts may notice a 
warning signal or cue in a monitored environment and fail to bridge between the 
intrasubjective and intersubjective levels of sensemaking – the results of which, always 
demonstrated in hindsight, can simply be catastrophic.  
Applying the principles of Weick’s sensemaking to early warning systems, provides 
organisations with the ability to construct a better view of a future full of possibilities. It 
allows them to anticipate, as well as prepare for, possible disruptive future events.  
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